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1. This Article is based in part on a paper entitled The Operator Under Oil 
& Gas Joint Operating Agreements—The 3 Rs of Responsibilities, Removal, and 
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and the New AAPL Form 610-2015 Model Form Operating Agreement,” a two-
day conference hosted by the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation and the 
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Denver, Colorado.
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INTRODUCTION
Next to the “granting instrument”2—either an oil and gas lease in the 
United States and parts of Canada, or a host country agreement 
elsewhere—probably the most important type of contract governing oil 
and gas exploration and production rights is the joint operating agreement 
(often called a “JOA”). A joint operating agreement typically is entered by 
parties that each own exploration and production rights in the same tract 
or in nearby tracts that the parties believe should be operated in a 
coordinated fashion.
Often, the parties to a JOA will co-own exploration and production 
rights throughout the entire area governed by the JOA under a single 
granting instrument. This is sometimes the case in the United States, and 
it is typically the case in other countries, where sovereign ownership of 
minerals is the general rule and granting instruments may cover large 
areas.
Other times, the area governed by the JOA consists of multiple, nearby 
tracts, and different parties to the JOA may own exploration and 
production rights in different tracts under separate granting instruments. 
In such cases, the companies holding those rights sometimes enter a JOA 
                                                                                                            
2. The “granting instrument” is the contract or other instrument by which an 
entity that owns the right to explore for and produce minerals grants the right to 
conduct exploration and production operations to someone else for a finite length 
of time. In most countries, the sovereign is the entity that owns oil and gas found 
naturally in the subsurface, as well as the exclusive right to explore for and 
produce those substances. In contrast, in the United States and parts of Canada, 
there is private ownership of minerals. Typically, mineral ownership is part of the 
bundle of rights that a landowner has. Accordingly, the landowner typically owns 
the minerals associated with his or her land, unless the landowner (or a 
predecessor-in-interest) has permanently alienated those rights, creating a “split 
estate” in which one person owns the land, but another person owns the minerals 
and the right to explore for and produce them.
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to facilitate their joint operation of the separate tracts in a coordinated 
fashion. Occasionally, different companies will hold operating rights in 
the same tract, but pursuant to different granting instruments. Or, the 
exploration and production rights of one (or more) of the parties to the 
operating agreement may be based on that party’s ownership of either the 
land itself or a severed mineral interest, rather than on holding rights under 
a granting instrument.
In any of these cases, however, the purpose of the joint operating 
agreement entered by the parties is to govern the exploration and 
production process, as well as the parties’ rights and duties with respect to 
one another. Joint operating agreements almost always name one of the 
parties as the “Operator” and vest that party with the exclusive right to 
operate the parties’ mineral interests in the area where the agreement 
applies, which is often called the “Contract Area” or something similar.
This Article covers issues relating to the Operator,3 including such 
topics as the selection of the Operator, the relationship between the 
Operator and non-operator parties, the duties of the Operator, the standard 
of care to which the Operator is held, resignation and removal of 
Operators, the selection of a successor Operator after an Operator resigns 
or is removed, whether Operators can assign the Operatorship, and the 
potential right of non-owners (persons who do not own an operating right 
in the mineral interests covered by the agreement) to serve as Operator.
To some extent, this Article will cover general legal principles and 
practices relating to the position of Operator, but the Article also will give 
special attention to how various issues are covered under certain model 
form joint operating agreements. Such attention is merited because, 
although some parties draft their own operating agreements, it is very 
common for parties to use model forms as their joint operating agreements.
Further, there are a handful, but only a handful, of commonly used forms. 
This means that certain model forms are used with sufficient frequency to 
justify discussion of the forms, but such forms are few enough in number 
that a comparison of the forms in a law journal article is feasible.
                                                                                                            
3. Many joint operating agreements capitalize “Operator.” When discussing 
specific provisions of those agreements, it sometimes would be appropriate for 
this Article to capitalize “Operator,” even if the Article was not quoting the 
provision. On the other hand, when this Article is discussing general principles 
regarding the position of operator, it probably would be appropriate under rules
of grammar to refrain from capitalizing “operator.” But in writing this Article, the 
author found that in some sentences it was difficult to decide whether “Operator”
or “operator” was more appropriate. For convenience, “Operator” will henceforth 
be used throughout the Article except in any quotation that used “operator” or 
when referring to the reasonably prudent operator standard.
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In the United States, the most commonly used model form for onshore 
joint operations is the AAPL Form 610.4 The first version of the Form 610 
was the 1956 version. Later versions include the 1977 version, 1982 
version, 1989 version, a version of the 1989 form that was modified in 
2013 with suggested revisions for use with horizontal wells, and finally 
the “2015” version, which was released in 2016. This Article often starts 
the discussion of a particular issue by considering how relevant provisions 
in the 2015 version of AAPL Form 610 address the issue, after which this 
Article considers how analogous provisions in earlier versions of the 
AAPL Form 610 deal with the issue. (The earlier versions of Form 610 
remain relevant because parties sometimes use the earlier versions of the 
forms when entering new agreements and also because many older 
agreements, which parties entered before the newer versions of the form
became available, remain in effect today.) Sometimes, particularly when 
different model forms take a very similar approach, the examination of 
some forms will be reserved for footnotes to avoid discussion of multiple 
very similar provisions in the text of this Article.
The model forms that will be discussed in this Article include the:
x AAPL Form 610 (2015), as well as the 1989, 1982, 1977, 
and 1956 versions of Form 610, and AAPL 610-HN (a 
version of the 1989 Form 610 modified for use with 
horizontal wells)
x AAPL Form 710-2002 (hereinafter, “AAPL 710”)
(designed for offshore)
x AAPL Form 810 (2007) (designed for deep water 
operations) (hereinafter, “AAPL 810”)
x Rocky Mountain Joint Operating Agreement Form 3 
(“Rocky Mountain Form 3”)
x CAPL 20075 (a form often used in Canada) (hereinafter, 
“CAPL”)
x 2012 AIPN Model Form6 (a form commonly used 
internationally)
x UKCS 20097 (a form used on the United Kingdom’s 
                                                                                                            
4. “AAPL” is an acronym for the American Association of Professional 
Landmen, formerly known as the American Association of Petroleum Landmen. 
The AAPL has produced a number of model forms, with the most commonly used 
perhaps being the AAPL Form 610 Model Form Operating Agreements. 
5. “CAPL” is an acronym for the Canadian Association of Petroleum 
Landmen.
6. “AIPN” is an acronym for the Association of International Petroleum 
Negotiators.
7. “UKCS” is an acronym for the United Kingdom Continental Shelf. “Oil 
and Gas UK,” a trade group, developed the UKCS 2009 form.
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continental shelf) (hereinafter, “UKCS”)
x AMPLA (an Australian form).
I. THE INITIAL SELECTION OF OPERATOR
As a general rule, it would be inefficient if more than one of the parties 
to a joint operating agreement attempted to conduct operations.8
Accordingly, model form joint operating agreements almost always 
provide that a single party will be designated as the “Operator,” and only 
the Operator will have authority to conduct most operations.9 This is true 
                                                                                                            
8. David H. Sweeney, Oil and Gas Joint Operating Agreements: A 
Comparative World-Wide Analysis §§ 2.01 and 6.01 (Lexis Nexis 2016); CLAUDE 
DUVAL ET AL., INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM EXPLORATION AND EXPLOITATION 
AGREEMENTS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLICY ASPECTS, 289 (2d ed. 2009).
9. The 2015, 1989, 1982, and 1977 versions of AAPL Form 610 each 
provide in Article V.A for the designation of an Operator that will have “full 
control of all operations.” Similarly, Paragraph 5 of the 1956 version of AAPL 
Form 610 provides for an Operator that would have “full control of all 
operations.” See also AAPL 710 art. 5.1; AAPL 810 art. 5.1.
In the 2012 AIPN Model Form JOA, Article 4.1 provides for designation of an 
“Operator” and Article 4.2 provides that the Operator “shall have exclusive charge 
of Joint Operations, and shall conduct all Joint Operations.”
Clause 6.1 of the AMPLA Form provides for appointment of the “Operator” and 
Clause 7.2 provides that “the Operator is entitled to have possession and control 
of all Joint Venture Property and must, either itself or through such third parties 
as it may engage” perform various tasks, including joint operations. 
Section 5.1 of the UKCS Form provides for designation of an “Operator” and 
Section 6.1 provides that “the Operator has the right and is obliged to conduct the 
Joint Operations by itself, its agents or its contractors.”
The CAPL Form provides for an Operator that is named in a “Heads of 
Agreement” to which the joint operating agreement is attached. See CAPL art. 
3.01; see also CAPL art. 1.01 (definition of “Heads of Agreement”). Further, art. 
3.01 states that “the Parties delegate to the Operator, on their behalf, management 
of the exploration, development and operation of the Joint Lands.”
Article 4.1 of Rocky Mountain Form 3 states that the “Operator shall direct and
have control of all operations conducted hereunder and shall have exclusive 
custody of all materials, equipment, and other property owned by the parties.”
Of course, in addition to ensuring that multiple parties do not attempt to conduct 
operations, it is important to make sure that someone conducts operations. The 
same clauses that confer exclusive operational authority on the Operator often 
also impose on the Operator a duty to conduct operations. See Section II of this 
Article.
A potential exception to the general rule that the Operator perform all operations 
concerns operations in which the Operator chooses not to participate—that is, it 
chooses not to participate in the cost of a particular operation. Most operating 
agreements provide for the possibility of operations in which some parties 
participate and other parties do not. See, e.g., Art. V.B.2 of the 2015, 1989, 1982, 
and 1977 versions of AAPL Form 610; AAPL Form 710, art. 10.5; AAPL Form 
810, art. 8.4; Rocky Mountain Form 3, § 9.3; 2012 AIPN art. 7; AMPLA cl. 13; 
CAPL arts. 9.03 & 10; UKCS cl. 15. Under some operating agreements, if the 
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for model forms used in the United States and those used elsewhere. The 
2015 version of AAPL Form 610 is a typical example. It states that the 
Operator “shall conduct and direct and have full control of all operations 
conducted under this agreement as permitted and required by, and within 
the limits of this agreement.”10
Typically, if parties contemplate agreeing to a JOA, they select an 
Operator prior to executing the JOA as part of their negotiations regarding 
the JOA (instead of executing a JOA and then selecting the Operator later).
Indeed, most standard JOA forms provide a blank for the parties to insert 
the name of the party designated as Operator. This is the case with the 
2015 version of AAPL Form 610. The first sentence of Article V.A of that 
form begins: “____________ shall be the Operator of the Contract 
Area….” In the 1989, 1982, and 1977 versions, the first sentence of Article 
V.A begins exactly the same way.11
The parties to a joint operating agreement usually select the party with 
the largest working interest to be the Operator,12 and some model forms 
                                                                                                            
Operator chooses not to participate in a particular operation, the participating 
parties have the option to request that the Operator perform the work on behalf of
the participating parties, but they also have the right to designate one of the 
participating parties to conduct that particular operation. See, e.g., Art. V.B.2 of 
the 2015, 1989, 1982, and 1977 AAPL Forms. See also AAPL Form 710 art. 4.2; 
AAPL Form 810 art. 4.2; 2012 AIPN arts. 7.2.E.1 (optional provision) and 7.12.F 
(optional provision); AMPLA cl. 13.3(a); CAPL cl. 10.04; UKCS cl. 15.2.9. 
10. 2015 AAPL art. V.A. Older versions of AAPL Form 610, as well as other 
model form joint operating agreements, contain similar provisions. In Article 
V.A., the 1989 and 1982 Forms each stated that the Operator “shall conduct and 
direct and have full control of all operations on the Contract Area as permitted 
and required by, and within the limits of this agreement.” Article V.A of the 1979 
Form had language that is identical, but for a comma after “limits of.”
11. The first sentence of Paragraph 5 of the 1956 AAPL Form begins: 
“________ shall be the Operator of the Unit Area….” Article 4.1 of the 2012 
AIPN Form begins: “________ is designated as Operator…” The AMPLA Form 
contains a blank for naming the actual Operator in Schedule 1 to the JOA. Article 
5.1 of the UKCS form begins: “[ ] is hereby designated and agrees to act as the 
Operator.” Article 4.1 of the 2002 AAPL Form 710 begins: “_______ is 
designated as the Operator of the Lease.” Article 4.1 of the 2007 AAPL Form 810 
begins: “________ is designated as the Operator of the Contract Area.” In Rocky 
Mountain Form 3, Article 1.5 begins, “‘Operator’ means ________ herein 
designated as Operator. . . .”
12. Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Hawkins Oil & Gas, Inc., 282 Ark. 268, 668 
S.W. 2d 16 (1984) (plaintiff “was to be named the operator of the unit drilling 
operations in as much as it had a predominant position …”); Scott C. Styles, Joint 
Operating Agreements 375, in OIL AND GAS LAW—CURRENT PRACTICE AND 
EMERGING TRENDS (Greg Gordon et al. eds., 2d ed. 2010) (“Usually, the JOA 
member with the largest percentage interest in the JOA will be the operator….”); 
CLAUDE DUVAL ET AL., INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM EXPLORATION AND 
EXPLOITATION AGREEMENTS, 289 (2d ed. 2009).
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clearly assume that this will be the case.13 Commentators have explained 
that this typical practice is grounded in the rationale that the company with 
the largest interest will have the greatest motivation to operate prudently 
and efficiently.14 Further, the party with the largest ownership interest 
often desires to be the Operator. Such a desire generally will not be based 
on hopes of making a profit by serving in the role as Operator. As
discussed further in Section IV(C) of this Article, the Operator generally 
is not entitled to make a profit from its service as Operator, though it is 
entitled to reimbursement of its expenses. In part, the desire to serve as 
Operator may arise from the attitude encapsulated in the old adage, “If you 
want something done right, do it yourself.” But perhaps the primary reason 
a company might wish to serve as Operator is that the Operator “de facto 
has much more say” and control of operations than do any of the other 
parties.15
Notwithstanding the general tendency to choose the party with the 
largest ownership interest as Operator, parties are free to agree to the 
selection of some other company as Operator. Parties sometimes do this, 
particularly if a company with a smaller working interest has special 
expertise or if there is some other reason why another company should 
serve as Operator.16
                                                                                                            
13. The AMPLA Form provides that, “if the largest Participating Interest is 
no longer held by the Operator,” the Operator’s term continues (assuming it does 
not end for some other reason) “until the Operating Committee determines if and 
when a new Operator should be appointed.” AMPLA cl. 6.2(c). AAPL Form 710 
provides for the possible removal of the Operator if, because of an assignment to 
a Non-Affiliate, its working interest is reduced to “less than the Working Interest 
of a Non-operator.” AAPL Form 710 art. 4.4(c). The 2012 AIPN Form provides 
for the possibility of removing the Operator if its ownership interest falls below a 
specified fraction. See 2012 AIPN 4.10(C). The new 2015 AAPL Form 610 
contains a provision whereby the parties can provide for that the Operator will be 
deemed to have resigned if it loses or transfers more than a specified portion of 
its ownership interest. 2015 AAPL Form 610 art. V.B.2.
14. David H. Sweeney, Oil and Gas Joint Operating Agreements: A 
Comparative World-Wide Analysis § 6.01 (LexisNexis 2016) (“The party with the 
largest interest in the contract area is frequently selected as the operator under the 
theory that this party has the most ‘skin in the game.’”); CLAUDE DUVAL ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM EXPLORATION AND EXPLOITATION AGREEMENTS:
LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLICY ASPECTS 289 (2d ed. 2009).
15. Scott C. Styles, Joint Operating Agreements 375, in OIL AND GAS LAW—
CURRENT PRACTICE AND EMERGING TRENDS (Greg Gordon et al. eds., 2d ed. 
2010).
16. David H. Sweeney, Oil and Gas Joint Operating Agreements: A 
Comparative World-Wide Analysis § 6.01 (LexisNexis 2016).
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A. The Requirement that the Operator Generally Must Own an Interest 
Governed by the JOA
Many joint operating agreements either state or implicitly assume that 
only a party who owns an interest governed by the agreement may serve 
as Operator.17 For example, the 1989 and 1982 Versions of AAPL Form 
610 seem to assume that the Operator must own an interest. Those forms 
state that the Operator will “be deemed to have resigned” if it ceases to 
own an interest that is governed by the joint operating agreement.18 AAPL 
forms 710 and 810, which are designed for use offshore, contain similar 
language about a “deemed” resignation.19 The 1977 version of Form 610 
states that the Operator will “cease to be Operator” if it no longer owns an 
interest.20 The 2015 version of AAPL Form 610 expressly states a general 
rule that the Operator must own an interest, though it recognizes that 
parties can agree to hire a “contract Operator” that does not own an 
interest.21
Some of the other model form JOAs give parties to the agreement the 
right to remove the Operator if the ownership interest of the Operator (or, 
of the Operator and its affiliates together) falls below a specified level. The 
AMPLA form and the two AAPL offshore forms each provide for the 
possibility of removing the Operator if the Operator makes an assignment 
of interest that results in any other party having a larger ownership share 
than the Operator.22 The 2012 AIPN form contains an optional provision 
that would allow the Non-Operators to remove the Operator if the 
combination of the Operator’s interest and its affiliates’ interests falls 
below a percentage that is to be specified by the parties (the form contains 
a blank for the parties to fill-in with a percentage). The UKCS form 
provides that the Operator may be removed if neither it nor its affiliates 
holds an ownership interest.23
B. Selecting an Operator that Does Not Own an Interest
In most cases, the parties to a joint operating agreement choose one of 
the owners of the interest governed by the joint operating agreement to 
serve as Operator. Occasionally, however, the parties hire a non-owner to 
                                                                                                            
17. Perhaps this is due to some of the same reasons that the parties typically 
choose the party with the largest interest as Operator.
18. 1989 AAPL 610 art. V.B.1.; 1982 AAPL 610 art. V.B.1. 
19. 2002 AAPL 710 art. 4.3; 2007 AAPL 810 art. 4.3.
20. 1977 AAPL 610 art. V.B.1. 
21. 2015 AAPL 610 art. V.A.
22. AMPLA cl. 6.2(c); 2002 AAPL 710 art. 4.4(c); 2007 AAPL 810 art. 4.4.1.
23. UKCS cl. 5.3.2(g).
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serve as Operator. Such non-owner Operators are sometimes called 
“contract Operators.” A contract Operator might be a company that is not 
affiliated with any of the owners, or it may be an affiliate of one of the 
owners. One of the reasons owners of mineral interests typically avoid the 
use of contract Operators is a concern that a contract Operator’s interest 
will not be aligned with the owners, and that the contract Operator’s 
primary interest will be to make a profit by serving as Operator, rather than 
to maximize profits for the owners. Such non-alignments of interest can 
occur in many types of commercial transactions, but that does not diminish 
the concerns of some owners in the JOA context. The concerns may be 
lessened somewhat if the contract Operator is an affiliate of one of the 
owners, but even in those circumstances the concerns may remain.
The pre-2015 versions of AAPL Form 610 do not expressly address 
whether the initial Operator must own an interest that is governed by the 
joint operating agreement. But most of the pre-2015 Forms seem to 
implicitly preclude the selection of a person that does not own an interest 
under the agreement to serve as the initial Operator (of course parties 
would be free to agree to deviate from the model language—either by 
express revision or by simply choosing a non-owning Operator).24
The 2015 AAPL Form makes a change. It recognizes that, as a general 
rule, the Operator must own an interest, but the parties can agree to a non-
owning person serving as Operator.25 The Form provides, however, that 
before a person that does not own an interest governed by the joint 
operating agreement can serve as Operator, the person must either enter a 
separate agreement with the Non-Operators to govern their relationship, 
or insert Article XVI provisions into the agreement to govern the 
relationship.26
C. Considerations in the International Context
In the international context, additional considerations may exist. For 
example, outside the United States, mineral rights are typically owned by 
the sovereign, rather than by private landowners; and the government 
reserves the right to approve or disapprove the parties’ selection of an 
                                                                                                            
24. Parties who choose to use an older form but deviate from the implicit 
requirement that the Operator own an interest should be careful to make clear 
whether their intent is to waive the ownership requirement for all future selections 
of successor Operators under their joint operating agreement or just for the initial 
selection.
25. 2015 AAPL 610 art. V.A.
26. Id.
2019] A COMPARISON OF OPERATORSHIP PROVISIONS IN OIL & GAS JOAS 89
Operator.27 Indeed, the Operator often is named in the instrument by which 
the government grants companies exploration and production rights.28
Sometimes, the government requires that its national oil company serve as 
Operator.29
II. DUTIES OF THE OPERATOR
Joint operating agreements typically impose a variety of duties on the 
Operator. For convenience, these can be grouped into three types of duty: 
operational, financial, and informational and reporting. Each of these is 
discussed below.
A. Operational Duties
An earlier section of this Article noted that joint operating agreements 
give one party, known as the “Operator,” the exclusive authority to operate 
in order to avoid the inefficiencies and other problems that might arise 
from duplicative or conflicting operations by different parties.30 It also is 
important, however, to ensure that someone conducts operations.
Accordingly, joint operating agreements typically impose on the Operator 
a duty to operate. The 2015 version of AAPL Form 610 provides an 
                                                                                                            
27. David H. Sweeney, Oil and Gas Joint Operating Agreements: A 
Comparative World-Wide Analysis §§ 6.01 and 6.02 (LexisNexis 2016); Scott C. 
Styles, Joint Operating Agreements 375, found in OIL AND GAS LAW—CURRENT 
PRACTICE AND EMERGING TRENDS (Greg Gordon et al. eds., 2d ed. 2010) (in the 
U.K., the choice of operator must be approved by government).
28. David H. Sweeney, Oil and Gas Joint Operating Agreements: A 
Comparative World-Wide Analysis § 6.02 (LexisNexis 2016).
29. Id. § 6.01.
30. First, these provisions seek to avoid the possibility of duplicative or 
conflicting operations by different parties by vesting exclusive operating authority 
in one party. See Section I of this Article. Second, these provisions attempt to give 
the Operator a degree of control over operations that is characteristic of the control 
that an independent contractor has over the work it is hired to do (as opposed to 
the lesser degree of control that is held an employee or agent who works under 
the direction of the principal). For reasons that will be discussed in more detail 
later, the parties to joint operating agreements often would prefer that the Operator 
be classified as an independent contractor, rather than as the agent of the Non-
Operators. This issue will be discussed in Section IV of this Article.
These clauses typically do this with relatively little discussion, simply declaring 
that the Operator shall conduct “all” operations or have “exclusive charge” of 
operations or something similar. 2015 AAPL Form 610 art. V.A (“shall conduct 
and direct and have full control of all operations”); AAPL Form 710 art. 5.1 
(“exclusive right and duty to conduct operations”); AAPL Form 810 (“the
exclusive right and duty to conduct (or cause to be conducted) all activities or 
operations”); 2012 AIPN art. 4.2.A (“exclusive charge”); UKCS cl. 6.1.1 (“the 
Operator has the right and is obliged to conduct the Joint Operations”).
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example. Article V.A, states that the Operator “shall conduct and direct . .
. all operations conducted under this agreement.”31 Similar or identical 
language is contained in the earlier versions of AAPL Form 61032 and in 
other model forms.33
Joint operating agreements do not specify the particular operations 
that the Operator must perform. This lack of detail is unavoidable. Because 
of the uncertainties involved in the exploration, development, and 
production processes, it is not possible to spell out in detail the particular 
wells to be drilled or reworked, the specific depth to which wells should 
be drilled, and so forth. For this reason, many disputes regarding the 
Operator’s conduct of operations will turn on whether the Operator has 
complied with certain standards of conduct which are set forth in the JOA 
(those standards are discussed in Section III of this Article), rather than 
whether the Operator breached a specific duty.
Nevertheless, some operating agreements specify certain operational 
duties in slightly more detail. As noted below, these include (1) duties 
relating to testing, and (2) duties relating to drilling horizontal wells for 
the distance and to the stratum that was proposed.
1. Duty to Test
Some model forms impose additional, somewhat more specific 
operational duties. For example, Article V.D of the 2015 Form 610 
(entitled “Rights and Duties of Operator”) imposes at least two additional
operating duties. Article V.D.7(c) requires the Operator to “adequately test 
all Zones encountered within the Contract Area which may reasonably be 
expected to be capable of production of oil and gas in paying quantities as 
a result of examination of the electric log or any other logs or cores or tests
conducted hereunder.”34 This testing requirement is essentially identical to 
the testing requirement contained in the 1989, 1982, 1977, and 1956 
                                                                                                            
31. Article V of the 2015 AAPL Form is entitled “Designation and 
Responsibilities of Operator.”
32. 1989 AAPL art. V.A; 1982 AAPL art. V.A; 1977 AAPL art. V.A; 1956 
AAPL art. 5. 
33. AAPL Form 710 art. 5.1 (“duty to conduct operations”); AAPL Form 810 
(“duty to conduct . . . all activities or operations”); 2012 AIPN art. 4.2.A) (“shall 
operate”); UKCS cl. 6.1.1 (“Operator . . . is obliged to conduct the Joint 
Operations”).
34. “Zones” is defined to mean “a stratum of earth containing or thought to 
contain a common accumulation of Oil and Gas separately producible from any 
other common accumulation of Oil and Gas.” 2015 Form art. I.CC.
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Forms.35 The CAPL Form also imposes a duty to conduct tests.36 Other 
forms seem to assume tests will be conducted without expressly mandating 
a duty to test.37
The model forms that require the Operator to conduct tests do not state 
with great specificity what tests must be conducted—and any attempt to 
do so generally would be impractical.38 Accordingly, the resolution of any 
dispute concerning an Operator’s failure to conduct a particular test likely 
would depend on whether the failure constituted a breach of the standard 
of care imposed upon the Operator, a breach of an agreement of the parties 
relating to the testing of a particular well, or the breach of a binding drilling 
plan.
Disputes can also arise if the Operator conducts a test, but a Non-
Operator asserts that the test should not have been conducted or that the 
test was not done properly. For instance, sometimes Non-Operators object 
to testing that they think is unnecessary because of concerns over costs or 
the possibility that testing will damage the wellbore.39 If one or more Non-
Operators assert that the Operator incurred excessive expenses by 
performing a test that was unnecessary or that the Operator performed a 
necessary test in an improper manner, the dispute would be resolved based 
on application of the standards of care imposed by the operating agreement 
(the standard of care imposed by a JOA is discussed in Section III of this 
Article).
                                                                                                            
35. The 1989 Form addressed this duty in Art. V.D.7. The 1982 and 1977 Forms 
addressed testing in Article VI, entitled “Drilling and Development,” rather than in 
Article V. In Article VI.A, the 1982 and 1977 Forms stated: “Operator shall make 
reasonable tests of all formations encountered during drilling which give indication of 
containing oil and gas in quantities sufficient to test, unless this agreement shall be 
limited in its application to a specific formation or formations, in which event Operator 
shall be required to test only the formation or formations to which this agreement may 
apply.” The 1956 Form addressed the issue in Article 7.
36. CAPL cl. 7.03.
37. See, e.g., AMPLA cls. 1.1 (definition of “Good Australian Oilfield 
Practice”), 9.1 (discussion of well completion).
38. The CAPL Form, which may contain the most detail regarding testing, 
states that the Operator must “run agreed log surveys,” “test in accordance with 
the approved program,” conduct “such further tests as are warranted of any 
formations with showings of Petroleum Substances,” and “take such mud and 
drillstem test fluid samples as are appropriate to obtain accurate resistivity, mud 
filtrate and formation water readings.” CAPL cl. 7.03.
39. Andrew B. Derman, The New and Improved 1989 Joint Operating 
Agreement: A Working Manual, 31 (this is No. 15 in the American Bar 
Association’s “Natural Resources, Energy, and Environmental Law Section 
Monograph Series”). 
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2. Duty to Drill to Objective Zones and to the Proposed 
Displacement
Article V.D.7(d) of the AAPL Form 610 specifies an additional 
operating duty:
For any Horizontal Well drilled under this agreement, Operator 
shall drill such well to the objective Zone(s) and drill the Lateral 
in the Zone(s) to the proposed Displacement unless drilling 
operations are terminated pursuant to Article VI.G [relating to 
circumstances in which drilling operations encounter granite or 
other practically impenetrable substance or other difficulties] or 
Operator deems further drilling is neither justified nor required.40
In earlier versions of AAPL Form 610, Article V (the Article that contains 
most of the provisions relating to the Operator, including a specification 
of the Operator’s duties) does not contain any similar language, but the 
addition of this language to Article V in the 2015 Form may be less of a 
change than first appears. In some earlier versions of AAPL Form 610, 
Article VI (which governs provisions relating to drilling operations), the 
model form stated that the Operator must continue drilling certain wells to 
the planned depth except in certain circumstances, such as when the 
drilling encounters impenetrable substances or other problems.41
Similarly, AAPL 710 provides that the “Operator shall diligently conduct 
the operation . . . until the Objective Depth, unless the well encounters, at 
a lesser depth, impenetrable conditions or mechanical difficulties that 
cannot be overcome by reasonable and prudent operations.”42 The 2012 
AIPN Form contains a very similar provision,43 and the CAPL form places 
                                                                                                            
40. “Lateral” is defined as meaning “that portion of a wellbore of a Horizontal 
Well between the point at which the wellbore initially penetrates the objective 
Zone and the Terminus.” 2015 Form art. I. “Displacement” is defined having “the 
same meaning as the term defined by the state regulatory agency having 
jurisdiction over the Contract Area, in the absence of which the term shall 
otherwise mean the length of a Lateral.” Id.
41. 1989 AAPL Form art. 610 art. VI.F; 1982 AAPL Form 610 art. VI.A; 
1977 AAPL Form 610 art. VI.A; 1956 AAPL Form 610 art. 7.
42. AAPL Form 710 art. 10.7. In article 2.25, Form 710 defines “Objective 
Depth” as, “A depth sufficient to test the lesser of the Objective Horizon or the 
specific footage depth stated in the AFE and approved by the Participating 
Parties.” Form 710’s article 2.26 defines “Objective Horizon” as “The interval 
consisting of the deepest zone, formation, or horizon to be tested in an Exploratory 
Well, Development Well, Deepening operation, or Sidetracking operation, as 
stated in the AFE and approved by the Participating Parties.” See also AAPL 
Form 810 art. 10.1.4).(b).
43. 2012 AIPN art. 5.13.D.1.
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restrictions on an Operator’s deviation from the plan approved by the 
parties for a horizontal well.44
B. Financial Duties
Many operating agreements impose upon the Operator various 
financial duties that are important for purposes of managing the “joint 
account.” Often, operating agreements impose upon the Operator duties 
to:
x obtain competitive rates for goods and services,
x manage the joint account and discharge its obligations,
x protect the JOA assets against liens, and
x act as a custodian of funds.
The most recent versions of AAPL Form 610 impose each of these duties.
As discussed in more detail below, other model forms, used in the United 
States and elsewhere, impose similar sets of financial duties.
1. Duties to Obtain Competitive Rates
Because the Operator conducts all operations, the Operator typically 
is the only party to the JOA that enters contracts for the performance of 
work or for the provision of materials necessary to complete operations. 
However, all parties to the JOA are responsible for paying their 
proportionate share of the costs. Accordingly, JOAs typically impose upon
the Operator various duties relating to costs.
For example, the 2015 and 1989 versions of AAPL Form 610 require 
the Operator to ensure that all wells are drilled “on a competitive contract 
basis at the usual rates prevailing in the area.”45 Other forms used in the 
United States46 and elsewhere impose similar duties. For instance, the 
2012 AIPN form provides parties with a couple of options for the clause 
                                                                                                            
44. CAPL cl. 8.02(B).
45. 2015 Form art. V.D.1; 1989 Form art. V.D.1.
46. AAPL Form 710 art. 5.7 states in part:
Insofar as possible, Operator shall use competitive bidding to procure good 
and services for the benefit of the parties. All drilling operations . . . shall 
be conducted by properly qualified and responsible drilling contractors 
under current competitive contracts. A drilling contract will be deemed to 
be a current competitive if it (a) was made within__(__)months before the 
commencement of the well and (b) contains terms, raters, and provisions 
that, when the contract was made, did not exceed those generally 
prevailing in the area for operations involving substantially equivalent rigs 
that are capable of conducting the drilling operations.
See also AAPL Form 810 art. 5.3; Rocky Mountain Form 3 art. 4(9).
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to deal with this issue: Both options require the Operator to choose the 
“best qualified contractor” based on a combination of cost, quality, and 
ability, while one of the options would require the Operator to obtain 
competitive bids for contracts above a certain monetary value.47 The 
AMPLA Form requires the Operator to “obtain, evaluate and accept 
competitive quotes” for contracts.48 The CAPL form states that the 
Operator “will normally award contracts on a competitive basis” and the 
UKCS form generally requires the Operator to award contracts on a 
competitive basis if the cost of the contracts exceed a specified monetary 
value.49
In addition to generally requiring the Operator to secure contracts that 
contain competitive rates and terms, some model form joint operating 
agreements contain provisions that are designed to protect the Non-
Operators against self-dealing by the Operator. For example, the 2015 and 
1989 versions of AAPL Form 610 state that the Operator may use its own 
tools and equipment in the drilling of wells, but if it does so, the Operator 
must: (1) charge rates that do not exceed the rates prevailing in the area, 
(2) obtain the other parties’ written consent to its rates before commencing 
drilling operations, and (3) perform the work under the same terms and 
conditions as are customary and usual for that geographic area in contracts 
of independent contractors.50 The 1982 and 1977 Forms impose similar 
requirements relating to competitive rates and the Operator’s use of its 
own equipment.51 The offshore AAPL forms likewise contain such 
requirements.52
Further, model form joint operating agreements often contain 
provisions to regulate the costs, as well as other terms and conditions, of 
any contract that an Operator enters with one of its corporate affiliates.53
                                                                                                            
47. 2012 AIPN art. 6.7.
48. AMPLA cl. 7.2(c). 
49. CAPL cl. 3.03(B); see generally UKCS cls. 6.5.4, 6.5.5.
50. 2015 AAPL Form 610 art. V.D.1.
51. 1982 AAPL Form 610 art. V.D.1; 1977 Form art. V.D.1.
52. See 2002 AAPL Form 710 art. 5.7; see also 2007 AAPL Form 810 art. 5(3).
53. The 2015 and 1989 versions of AAPL Form 610 do not expressly give 
the Operator the right to use one of its own corporate affiliates to perform work 
or supply materials, but the forms implicitly suggest that the Operator may do so. 
Those forms state that “[a]ll work performed or materials supplied by an Affiliate 
of Operator” must meet certain requirements, but the consent of the other parties 
to the JOA does not appear to be a requirement. The forms state that all such work 
performed, or materials supplied by an affiliate of the Operator must be done 
“pursuant to written agreement.” One could argue that this provision means that 
the Operator must obtain the written consent of the parties to the JOA, but in 
context the provision appears to mean that anytime the Operator uses one of its 
affiliates the Operator must do so pursuant to a written contract with the affiliate. 
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The 2015 version of AAPL Form 610 illustrates this point. To the extent 
that work is to be performed or materials supplied by an “Affiliate”54 of 
the Operator, the 2015 Form provides that this must be done “at 
competitive rates, pursuant to written agreement, and in accordance with 
customs and standards prevailing in the industry.”55 This represents a 
minor change from the 1989 Form. The 1989 Form imposes the substance 
of this requirement, but it does so with respect to “affiliates or related 
parties of Operator,” and neither “affiliates” nor “related parties” are 
defined terms.56
The 2012 AIPN Form includes an optional provision which states that 
“before entering into contracts with Affiliates of Operator exceeding” a
specified dollar value, the Operator must obtain the consent of the 
Operating Committee.57 The UKCS Form similarly requires the Operator 
to obtain the consent of other parties before providing materials or services 
from its own resources or those of an affiliate, if the costs will exceed a 
                                                                                                            
In contrast to the AAPL Form 610, the 2012 AIPN expressly authorizes the 
Operator to hire its own affiliates. Article 4.2.A authorize the Operator to “employ 
independent contractors and agents, including Affiliates of Operator, Non-
Operators, or Affiliates of a Non-Operator.” See also AMPLA cl. 7.7; but see
AMPLA cl. 7.10.
54. “Affiliate” is defined to mean:
for a person, another person that controls, is controlled by, or is under 
common control with that person. For purposes of this definition, 
“control” means the ownership by one person, directly or indirectly, of 
more than fifty percent (50%) of the voting securities of a corporation 
or, for other persons, the equivalent ownership interest (such as a 
partnership interest), and “person” means an individual, corporation, 
partnership, trust, estate, unincorporated organization, association, or 
legal entity.
2015 AAPL Form 610 art. I.
55. 2015 AAPL Form art. V.D.1.
56. 1989 AAPL Form art. V.D1. Other than the 2015 Agreement’s providing 
using the defined term “Affiliate” in Article V(D)(1), instead of using “affiliates 
or related parties,” the financial duties imposed on the Operator by the 2015 Form
are the same as those imposed by the 1989 Form. Over time, however, there have 
been some changes in the COPAS Form that is commonly attached as Exhibit C 
to the APPL-610 joint operating agreements. This Article does not attempt to 
address COPAS in detail, much less the changes that have occurred in the COPAS 
Form over time. Further, any such changes do not change the basic nature of the 
Operator’s financial duties.
The 1982 and 1977 versions of AAPL Form 610 do not expressly address the use 
of affiliates of the Operator.
57. 2012 AIPN art. 6.7. The alternative that includes this requirement 
contains a blank that the parties to the joint operating agreement should fill-in to 
specify the dollar value that will trigger the consent requirement.
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value specified in the JOA.58 The AMPLA form states that the Operator 
may not contract with one of its affiliates (or with a Non-Operator or an 
affiliate of a Non-Operator) to provide goods or services for joint 
operations unless the contract is on “terms and conditions no less favorable 
to the [parties to the JOA] than an arm’s length commercial agreement 
with a Third Party supplier, and the proposed agreement has been 
approved by the Operating Committee.”59
2. Management of Joint Account 
Under the 2015 and 1989 versions of AAPL Form 610, the Operator 
must promptly pay “expenses incurred in the development and operation 
of the Contract Area pursuant to the agreement,” and charge each of the 
parties with their respective proportionate shares upon the expense basis 
set forth in the JOA’s Exhibit C—the standard COPAS provisions.60 The 
Operator must also keep an account record of the joint account, “showing 
expenses incurred and charges and credits made and received.”61 In the 
1982 and 1977 Forms, financial duties are not addressed in Article V, but 
Article VI.C requires the Operator to promptly pay costs. The AAPL 
offshore forms contain similar requirements.62
As with many other issues, Forms used outside the U.S. impose duties 
similar to those imposed by the AAPL Forms. For example, the 2012 
AIPN Form requires the Operator to “timely pay and discharge all costs 
and liabilities incurred in connection with Joint Operations,” to “exercise 
                                                                                                            
58. UKCS cl. 6.5.2(b). The UKCS Form contains a blank for the parties to 
fill-in to specify the monetary value of a contract that triggers the requirement to 
obtain consent from the other parties. Id.
59. AMPLA cl. 7.10. The quoted provision refers to the “Operating 
Committee.” JOA forms used outside the United States often provide for the 
creation of an operating committee that contains representatives of each party. See
2012 AIPN art. 5; AMPLA cl. 5; UKCS cl. 9 (“Joint Operating Committee”). The 
operating committee typically exercises some authority over budgets and other 
matters. See, e.g., AIPN art. VI.1.D; AMPLA cl. 8.2; UKCS cl. 10.1.2. 
Necessarily, the Operator still controls day-to-day matters, but the use of an 
operating committee may give the Non-Operators more oversight than they have 
under the various versions of AAPL Form 610, which do not provide for an 
operating committee.
60. 2015 AAPL 610 art. V.D.2; 1989 AAPL 610 art. V(D)(2). (“COPAS” is 
an acronym for Council of Petroleum Accounting Societies).
61. 2015 AAPL 610 art. V.D.2; 1989 AAPL 610 art. V.D.2.
62. Each of the two offshore forms requires the Operator to keep accurate 
books and records. See 2007 AAPL Form 710 art. 5.5; see also 2002 AAPL Form 
810 art. 5.5. Also, by requiring the Operators to seek to keep the contract area free 
of liens, see 2007 AAPL Form 710 art. 5.3; see also 2002 AAPL Form 810 art. 
5.4, the model forms implicitly require the Operator to promptly pay most 
expenses.
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due care with respect to the receipt, payment and accounting of funds,” and 
to charge all costs to the Joint Account in accordance with the “Accounting 
Procedure.”63 The Accounting Procedure, a separate document that is 
designed to be an exhibit to the JOA, requires the Operator to keep accurate 
books and records.64 Other model Forms used outside the U.S. contain 
analogous provisions.65
3. Protecting JOA Assets Against Liens
Many jurisdictions provide that if a contractor is not paid for its work 
relating to certain property, such as oil and gas wells or production 
facilities, the contractor may record a lien giving the contractor a security 
interest in those facilities.66 Individual workers and suppliers of equipment 
may be entitled to the same or similar protections.67 Many joint operating 
agreements require the Operator to protect the jointly-owned assets against 
such liens.
For example, under both the 2015 Form and the 1989 Form, the 
Operator is required: to pay or cause payment of all accounts of contractors 
and suppliers, as well as all wages and salaries, for all services and 
materials provided for work under the parties’ agreement; and to keep the 
area free of liens and encumbrances, except for any which arise from a 
bona fide dispute as to the services or supplies.68 AAPL Forms 710 and 
810 impose a similar requirement.69
As previously noted, in the 1982 and 1977 Forms, Article V did not 
address financial duties of the Operator, but Article VI.C generally 
required the Operator to promptly pay expenses. The 1982 and 1977 
Forms did not expressly address protection against liens, except to provide 
that, with respect to operations by less than all the parties, the Consenting 
Parties would keep the operations free from liens.70
                                                                                                            
63. 2012 AIPN art. 4.2.B.9; 2012 AIPN art. 4.2.B.3; 2012 AIPN art. 4.2.B.4.
64. 2012 AIPN Model Form International Accounting Procedure § 1.4.1:
Operator shall at all times maintain and keep true and correct records of 
the production and disposition of all Hydrocarbons, of all costs and 
expenditures under the Agreement, and of other data necessary or proper 
for the settlement of accounts between the Parties in connection with 
their rights and obligations under the Agreement to enable Parties to 
comply with their income tax and other legal and contractual obligations.
65. See, e.g., AMPLA cls. 7.5, 10; UKCS cl. 6.7; CAPL cl. 3.07.
66. See, e.g., Louisiana Oil Well Lien Act, LA. REV. STAT. 9:4861-4873 
(2018); N.D. CENT. CODE § 35-24-02 (2017); Oil and Gas Lien Act, N.M. STAT.
§§ 70-4-1 to -14 (2018); TEX. PROP. CODE §§ 56.001-56.006 (2017). 
67. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. § 9:4862(A)(3), (6) (2018).
68. 2015 AAPL 610 art. V.D.3; 1989 AAPL 610 art. V.D.3.
69. 2002 AAPL 710 art. 5.3; 2007 AAPL 810 art. 5.4.
70. 1982 AAPL 610 art. VI.B.2; 1977 AAPL 610 art. VI.B.2.
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Various standard forms used outside the United States impose similar 
duties.71 Article 4.2.B.9 of the 2012 AIPN form is illustrative. It requires 
that the Operator “timely pay and discharge all costs and liabilities 
incurred in connection with Joint Operations and use its reasonable 
endeavors to keep the Joint Property free from all liens, charges, and 
encumbrances arising out of Joint Operations.” The standard AMPLA 
form requires the Operator to “keep the Joint Venture Property free and 
clear of all Encumbrances, except for those Encumbrances specifically 
permitted under [the] agreement.”72
4. Acting as Custodian of Funds
Article V.D.4 of the 2015 AAPL Form 610 requires the Operator to 
hold, for the account of the Non-Operators, any money that is paid to the 
Operator by the Non-Operators or from sales of product from the Contract 
Area, until such funds are (1) used for their intended purpose, (2) delivered 
to the Non-Operators, or (3) applied toward debts as allowed under Article 
VII.B of the agreement.73 (Article VII.B provides that the parties grant 
liens to one another, and it governs those liens). Until the funds are used 
or delivered to the Non-Operators, the funds being held by the Operator 
continue to belong to the Non-Operator on whose behalf the funds were 
paid or advanced, but the Operator is not required to maintain separate 
accounts for such funds unless the parties have agreed otherwise.74 (Other 
AAPL forms that address the issue also state that the Operator need not 
establish a separate account.75)
Notably, Article V.D.4 of the 2015 Form suggests that the Operator 
has a fiduciary duty with respect to any funds that it holds. The provision 
states: “Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to establish a 
fiduciary relationship between Operator and Non-Operators for any 
purpose other than to account for Non-Operator funds as herein 
specifically provided.” This suggests that the Operator has a fiduciary duty 
for the limited purpose of accounting for funds, and by implication this 
provision reinforces the rule that the Operator does not have a fiduciary 
duty for most purposes. The 1989 version of AAPL Form 610 has a similar 
provision.76
                                                                                                            
71. See, e.g., 2012 AIPN art. 4.2.B.9; AMPLA cl. 7.2(o); CAPL cl. 3.06; 
UKCS cl. 6.3.
72. AMPLA cl. 7.2(o).
73. 2015 AAPL 610 art. V.D.4; 1989 AAPL 610 art. V.D.4.
74. 2015 AAPL 610 art. V.D.4; 1989 AAPL 610 art. V.D.4.
75. 1989 AAPL 610 art. V.D.4; 2002 AAPL 710 art. 8.5; 2007 AAPL 810 
art. 6.1.
76. 1989 AAPL 610 art. V.D.4.
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The 2012 AIPN form contains an optional provision by which parties
can prohibit the Operator from commingling funds it receives from the 
Non-Operators with the Operator’s own funds—thus, effectively requiring 
the Operator to establish a separate account.77 The AMPLA Form requires 
the Operator to pay costs and expenses incurred by the Operator in 
operations, and for “such purpose to open, maintain and operate one or 
more separate bank accounts (with which its own funds are not 
commingled) on behalf of” the parties to the operating agreement.78 The 
CAPL Form expressly authorizes the Operator to commingle funds, unless 
parties holding a majority of the Non-Operator ownership interests request 
otherwise, but the Form apparently anticipates that the Operator will have 
fiduciary duties with respect to the funds that it holds.79
C. Informational and Reporting Duties
Under joint operating agreements, Operators generally have duties to 
provide various information to regulators and the Non-Operators.
1. Reporting to Regulators
Often, statutes or regulations will require that certain information 
regarding operations be reported to a government agency. Typically, it 
would be inefficient and unnecessary for multiple parties to report the 
same information to regulators, but the parties must ensure that someone 
submits the information. Further, the Operator often will be in the best 
position to prepare reports and submit information because the Operator is 
the party that is handling day-to-day operations. Accordingly, model form
joint operating agreements often require the Operator to submit any reports 
required by law. For example, Article V.D.6 of AAPL’s 2015 Form 610 
states that the “Operator will file . . . all operational notices, reports or 
applications required to be filed by local, State, Federal or Indian agencies 
or authorities having jurisdiction over operations hereunder.” Prior 
versions of Form 610 imposed a similar duty.80
                                                                                                            
77. 2012 AIPN art. 4.8.A.
78. AMPLA cl. 7.2(e).
79. CAPL cl. 5.07; CAPL cl. 1.05.
80. Article V.D.6 of the 1989 Form expressly imposes such a duty, using 
language essentially identical to that in the 2015 Form. The 1982 Form does not 
expressly impose such a duty, but it seems to assume that the Operator will file 
such forms. Article VI.D of the 1982 and 1977 AAPL Forms describe the extent 
of the Operator’s duty to furnish the Non-Operators with copies of “forms or 
reports filed with governmental agencies,” thus implying that the Operator will 
have copies of those forms or reports because the Operator has prepared and filed 
them. 
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A difference between the 1989 and 2015 Form is that the 2015 Form 
expressly designates the Operator as the agent of the Non-Operators:
for the sole purpose of executing, filing for approval by a 
governmental agency as required under applicable law or regulation, 
and recording a declaration of pooling or communitization agreement 
to effectuate the pooling or communitization of the [oil and gas leases 
subject to the JOA] (to the extent legally allowed under their 
respective terms and conditions) to conform with a spacing order of 
a governmental agency having jurisdiction over any portion of the 
Contract Area. However, such agency shall only be exercised by 
Operator after providing written notice including a copy of the 
proposed pooling declaration or communitization agreement to Non-
Operators, and shall be binding upon any Non-Operator failing to 
produce to Operator a written objection with ten (10) days after such 
notice.81
Similar to AAPL Form 610, the 2012 AIPN form requires the Operator to 
provide all records, information, and reports that the granting instrument 
requires of the parties.82 The AMPLA form generally requires the Operator 
to “prepare, file and lodge all statutory reports as and when required” by 
law.83 Most other model forms also impose such duties on the Operator.84
2. Providing Information to Non-Operators
Because the Operator conducts day-to-day operations, it typically will 
possess all, or virtually all, information that exists regarding joint 
operations and will have daily access to physical facilities involved in 
operations. Non-Operators do not have this advantage, but within the oil 
and gas industry, the prevailing view is that Non-Operators should have a 
right to information and access. Accordingly, most operating agreements 
expressly require the operator to provide information to Non-Operators.
But not all information is equally important, and it could be burdensome 
for the Operator to collect and provide some types of information.
                                                                                                            
81. 2015 AAPL 610 art. V.A.
82. 2012 AIPN art. 4.2.B.11.
83. 2011 AMPLA cl. 7.2(k).
84. AAPL Form 710 requires the Operator to “make reports to governmental 
authorities it has a duty to make as Operator.” 2002 AAPL 710 art. 5.8. The intent 
of this provision probably is that the operator must submit all reports, other than 
any reports that the law might require each working interest owner to submit (such 
as income for purposes of income tax reporting). AAPL Form 810, section 5.6 
contains a similarly-worded requirement. See also 2011 AMPLA cl. 7.2(k); 
UKCS cl. 6.2.1(g).
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Therefore, JOAs typically specify the types of information that the 
Operator must provide. Similarly, joint operating agreements typically 
give Non-Operators a right of access to physical facilities to view and 
inspect them, while imposing some reasonable restrictions or conditions 
on such access in order to prevent undue interference with operations.
Also, it is notable that some JOAs give non-participating parties the right 
to a narrow set of information and access rights than other parties to the 
JOA.85
The 2015 version of AAPL 610 Form provides that the Operator must: 
x notify Non-Operators of the date on which drilling 
operations are commenced,
x send to Consenting Parties86 copies of all test results and 
reports that they reasonably request,
x permit other parties—either each Non-Operator or each 
Consenting Party (depending on the particular JOA)—full 
access to all operations,
x provide other parties—either each Non-Operator or each 
Consenting Party (depending on the particular JOA)—
access to operating records and other books and records 
relating to each operation, and
x file with regulators all required notices, applications, and 
reports, and upon request, furnish copies of such filings to 
Non-Operators.87
                                                                                                            
85. Under most operating agreements, certain operations can proceed without 
the unanimous consent of the parties. In such situations, each party typically will 
be given the chance to participate in the project by agreeing in advance to pay its 
share of costs or to “go non-consent,” and thereby not participate in the costs. 
When a party elects not to participate and therefore not pay its share of costs, that 
party generally is required to forego any share to the revenue from that 
operation—either permanently or until (and unless) the operation is so successful 
that revenue from the operation exceeds costs of the operation by a specified 
factor. Typically, non-participating parties do not forfeit all rights to information 
because they may have a right to share in revenue from the operation eventually, 
assuming the operation’s revenue exceeds its costs by a sufficient margin, and 
because the operation in which the party is not participating sometimes may affect 
other operations under the JOA.
86. A “Consenting Party” is “a party who agrees to join in and pay its share 
of the cost of any operation conducted under the provisions of this agreement.”
2015 AAPL art. I.D.
87. Article 5.1.F of Rocky Mountain Form 3 requires the Operator to supply 
a similar set of information. 
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It also requires the Operator to give the Non-Operators access to physical 
facilities so that they can observe operations.88
A significant change between the 1989 and 2015 versions of AAPL 
Form 610 is that under the 2015 Form, only Consenting Parties have the 
right to access well locations and to receive test results, logs, operating 
records, and most books and records relating to Operations.89 In contrast, 
under the 1989 Form, all Non-Operators were entitled to such access and 
information.90 Even under the 2015 Form, however, Non-Consenting 
Parties are entitled to production amounts and, if they request an audit, the 
information necessary to audit “the payout account.”91 Like the 2015 
version of AAPL Form 610, the AAPL offshore forms require the 
Operator to give a broad range of information to parties participating in an 
operation, while significantly restricting the scope of information that non-
participating parties are entitled to receive.92
The JOA forms used outside the United States similarly require the 
Operator to provide information to Non-Operators.93 For example, the 
2012 AIPN Form requires Operators to provide Non-Operators with: 
copies of all logs and surveys; the proposed well design and any revisions 
for each well; daily drilling reports; all tests, core data, and analysis 
reports; a final well recap report; plugging reports; seismic sections, and 
if applicable, shot point location maps; final (and if requested, 
intermediate) geological and geophysical maps, interpretations, and 
reports; engineering studies; and periodic progress reports.94 The 2012 
AIPN Form gives non-participating parties the right to some information, 
but also places some limits on their right to information.95
                                                                                                            
88. 2015 AAPL 610 art. V.D.5; see also Rocky Mountain Form 3, art. 5.1.F 
(giving Non-Operators the right to physical access).
89. 2015 AAPL 610 art. V.D.5.b.
90. 1989 AAPL 610 art. V.D. Like the older versions of AAPL Form 610, 
the portion of Rocky Mountain Form 3 that requires the Operator to provide 
information to other parties does not distinguish between participating and non-
participating parties. Rocky Mountain Form 3, art. 5.1.F.
91. 2015 AAPL 610 art. V.D.5.a.; 2015 AAPL 610 art. V.D.5.c.
92. 2002 AAPL 710 art. 5.9; 2007 AAPL 810, art. 5.7.; 2002 AAPL710, art. 
5.10; 2007 AAPL 810, art. 5.9.
93. See, e.g., 2012 AIPN art. 4.4.A; AMPLA cl. 7.1; CAPL cl. 7.02; UKCS 
cl. 6.8.
94. 2012 AIPN art. 4.4.A. The form gives parties the option to specify how 
often the Operator should provide progress reports. 
95. 2012 AIPN art. 7.4.A. The CAPL form likewise gives Non-Operators the 
right to information and access, CAPL cl. 7.02, but places some restrictions on
the access and information rights of non-participating parties. See CAPL art. 
10.19. The UKCS form follows a similar pattern. See UKCS cls. 6.8 (Operator’s 
duty to provide reports to other parties) and 15.2.8 (the right of parties not 
participating in “sole risk” operations to some, but not all of the information 
regarding sole risk operations).
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The AMPLA Form does not contain as detailed a list of the 
information that the Operator must provide, but it nevertheless imposes 
significant duties to supply information to the other parties. It requires the 
Operator to submit certain information to the Operating Committee, to 
provide reports that include “all well and reservoir reports” to 
“Participants,” and to provide certain information regarding the joint 
account to any party upon request.96 AIPN’s 2012 form also grants Non-
Operators the right to have representatives observe operations. Article 
4.2.B.8 states:
Upon receipt of reasonable advance notice, [the Operator must] 
permit representatives of any Party to have at all reasonable times 
during normal business hours and at such Party’s own risk and 
cost reasonable access to Joint Operations, to observe Joint 
Operations, to inspect Joint Property, to conduct HSE audits, and 
to conduct financial audits and to observe taking of inventory.
III. STANDARD OF CARE
A. The Standard Specified
Most operating agreements expressly impose a standard of care upon 
the Operator. The specified standard often includes multiple components, 
with typical components being requirements that the operator perform 
work as a reasonably prudent operator, in a good and workmanlike 
manner, consistent with good oilfield practice, and in compliance with 
applicable laws and regulations. Some forms add an express requirement 
that operations be conducted in compliance with the granting instrument.97
The standard specified in Article V.A of the 2015 Form is typical. It 
requires that the Operator “conduct its activities under this agreement as a 
reasonably prudent operator, in a good and workmanlike manner, with due 
diligence and dispatch, in accordance with good oilfield practice, and in 
compliance with applicable law and regulations.” The 1989 Form 
contained an identical standard, while the earlier AAPL 610 Forms 
required the Operator to conduct “all such operations in a good and 
workmanlike manner.”98
                                                                                                            
96. AMPLA cl. 7.1(e); AMPLA cl. 7.1(f); AMPLA cl. 7.5(b). 
97. For example, Article 5.1.C of Rocky Mountain Form 3 requires the 
Operator to “[c]omply with the terms of the oil and gas leases [to which the JOA 
applies] and with all applicable laws and regulations.”
98. 1989 AAPL 610, Art. V.A.; 1982 AAPL 610, Art. V.A; 1977 AAPL 610, 
Art. V.A; 1956 AAPL 610, art. 5. 
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Similarly, one of the AAPL offshore forms requires the operator to 
“timely commence and conduct all operations in a good and workmanlike 
manner, as would a prudent operator under the same or similar 
circumstances,”99 while the other contains the same language, except for 
replacing “operations” with “activities or operations.”100 Both require the 
Operator to conduct operations in compliance with the law.101
Forms used outside the United States seem to impose analogous 
standards.102 The 2012 AIPN Form requires the Operator to conduct all 
joint operations “in a diligent, safe, and efficient manner in accordance 
with good and prudent petroleum industry practices and field conservation 
principles generally followed by the international petroleum industry 
under similar circumstances,” and in compliance with the granting 
instrument and “the Laws.”103 The AMPLA form contains similar 
language, but also adds requirements relating to fair dealing, stating that 
the Operator must “conduct Joint Operations in a good, workmanlike and 
commercially impartial and reasonable manner in accordance with Good 
Australian Oilfield Practice,”104 and that the Operator must “act in utmost 
good faith in all its dealings, as Operator, with each” of the other parties.105
Of course, “good and workmanlike manner” refers to a general 
standard of conduct. The parties to a JOA specify a standard of conduct 
instead of attempting to specify exactly what the Operator must do in all 
future circumstances because at the time the JOA is entered, the 
circumstances that will arise in future operations are unknown and the 
range of possible circumstances is unlimited.
It is probably impossible to define the “good and workmanlike 
manner” standard, except in very general terms, but existing case law may 
shed some light on the standard and how courts have applied it. In the 
                                                                                                            
99. This requirement is contained in art. 5.2 of the AAPL Form 710. 
100. AAPL Form 810, art. 5.2. art. 26.4 requires all Parties to comply with “all 
laws, orders, rules, and regulations,” and article 5.10 requires compliance with 
health, safety, and environmental regulations.
101. Article 5.6 of AAPL Form 710 requires the Operator to conduct 
operations in compliance with the law. See also AAPL Form 810, art. 26.4.
102. Article 3.04 of the CAPL form requires the Operator to “conduct all Joint 
Operations diligently, in a good and workmanlike manner, in compliance with the 
Title Documents and the Regulations and in accordance with good oilfield 
practice.”
Clauses 6.2.2(a) and (b) of the UKCS form require the Operator to “conduct the 
Joint Operations in a proper and workmanlike manner in accordance with Good 
Oilfield Practice,” and “in compliance with the requirements of the Acts, the 
License, and any other applicable Legislation.”
103. AIPN art. 4.2.B.2; AIPN art. 4.2.B.1. 
104. AMPLA cl. 7.1(c) (Section 1.1 of the AMPLA form provides a lengthy 
definition of “Good Australian Oilfield Practice.”).
105. AMPLA cl. 7.1(g).
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context of a drilling contract that obligated a party to perform in a “good 
and workmanlike manner,” a Texas appellate court expressed approval for 
a definition providing that the work must be performed “as a person skilled 
in that business should do it—in a manner generally considered skillful by 
those capable of judging such work in the community of the 
performance.”106 In a context outside the oil and gas industry, the Texas 
Supreme Court defined “good and workmanlike manner” as meaning “that 
quality of work performed by one who has the knowledge, training, or 
experience necessary for the successful practice of a trade or occupation 
and performed in a manner considered proficient by those capable of 
judging such work.”107 Similarly, Black’s Law Dictionary defines “good 
and workmanlike” as meaning “[i]n a manner generally considered skillful 
by those capable of judging such work in the community of its 
performance.”108
Relatively few cases address the meaning of “good and workmanlike 
manner” in the context of joint operating agreements. A few cases that 
have addressed the standard in this context seem to have equated the “good 
and workmanlike manner” standard with the “prudent operator” standard.
In Johnston v. American Cometra, Inc., non-operators brought suit against 
the Operator in a Texas state court, complaining in part that the Operator 
breached its duties by failing to bring a take-or-pay claim on behalf of the 
parties to the operating agreement.109 The district court granted summary 
judgment to the Operator, dismissing the claims that were based on the 
failure to assert a take-or-pay claim.110
The appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The appellate 
court acknowledged that the joint operating agreement contained clauses 
that could support the Operator’s argument that it did not owe a fiduciary 
duty to the non-operators.111 But the court stated that even though the 
Operator might not owe fiduciary duties, the Operator owed other duties 
to the non-operators, including the duty to perform in a “good and 
workmanlike manner.”112 The court concluded that this required the 
Operator to “perform as a reasonably prudent operator.”113
The court went on to hold that, because the summary judgment record 
did not preclude the possibility that a reasonably prudent operator would 
                                                                                                            
106. Westbrook v. Watts, 268 S.W.2d 694, 698 (Tex. App. 1954).
107. Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1987).
108. Good and Workmanlike, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990).
109. 837 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. App. 1992).
110. Johnston v. American Cometra, Inc., 837 S.W.2d 711, 713 (Tex. App. 
1992).
111. Id. at 716. 
112. Id.
113. Id.
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have asserted a take-or-pay claim on behalf of the non-operators, the 
portion of the summary judgment ruling that dismissed the plaintiffs’ 
complaint as it related to that issue should be reversed.114 This should not 
be read as indicating that the prudent operator standard would require an 
Operator to assert a take-or-pay claim on behalf of the non-operators.
Instead, the case merely stands for the proposition that this is a question of 
fact. Thus, the primary importance of American Cometra is that: (1) it 
equates the “good and workman manner” standard with the prudent 
operator standard, and (2) it illustrates that the question of whether the 
standard has been breached is an issue of fact.
Norman v. Apache Corp., was another appeal of a summary judgment 
decision.115 The case was a diversity jurisdiction case that arose in Texas, 
and the court cited American Cometra in support of the proposition that 
the “good and workmanlike manner” standard required the Operator to act 
as a reasonably prudent operator.116 Here, the Operator permanently 
abandoned a unit well that the Operator asserted was no longer economic.
Although the well was the only well that was holding certain leases beyond 
the primary term,117 the Operator did not inform the non-operators in 
advance that it was abandoning the well. The leases that had been held by 
the well’s production had cessation of production clauses118—some with a 
60-day period and others with a 90-day period—but those periods had 
already lapsed by the time that the Operator informed the non-operators 
that the well had been abandoned.119 Thus, the leases were lost. 
The non-operators filed suit, complaining that the Operator breached 
its duties by not informing them in advance that it planned to permanently 
abandon the wells. Based on certain portions of the operating agreement 
                                                                                                            
114. Id. at 716, 718.
115. 19 F.3d 1017 (5th Cir. 1994).
116. Norman v. Apache Corp., 19 F.3d 1017, 1019-20 (5th Cir. 1994) (case 
removed from state court based on diversity jurisdiction). Id. at 1029-30 (equating 
good and workman like manner standard and prudent operator standard).
117. In the United States, oil and gas leases are virtually always granted for a 
primary term of specified length (typically a few years) and as long thereafter as 
there is production of oil or gas in paying quantities. If the lease is beyond the 
primary term, a well that is producing oil or gas in paying quantities, and which
thus is keeping the lease alive, is described as “maintaining” or “holding” the 
lease.
118. A cessation of production clause is a type of savings clause. Such a clause 
typically provides that, if a lease has been held by production after the primary 
term and such production ceases, the lease will not terminate if the lessee takes 
certain action—such as to re-establish production in the well, to commence 
reworking of that well, or the commence drilling operations for a new well—
within some specified number of days. See Patrick H. Martin and Bruce M. 
Kramer, MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS (14th ed. 2009).
119. Norman v. Apache Corp., 19 F.3d 1017, 1019 (5th Cir. 1994).
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that were quoted by the court, it appears that the parties may have been 
using a modified version of the 1956 version of the AAPL Form-610. In 
any event, the United States Fifth Circuit held that the operating agreement 
did not expressly require the Operator to inform the non-operators in 
advance about the permanent abandonment of a well, but that the district 
court erred by granting summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s claim 
that the Operator breached its duty to perform in a good and workmanlike 
manner. Thus, Norman does two relevant things here—it (1) reinforces the 
view that, at least under Texas law, the good and workmanlike manner 
standard requires an Operator to perform as a reasonably prudent operator, 
and (2) declares that whether this standard has been breached will be a fact 
issue. 
As for the reasonably prudent operator standard, much of the 
jurisprudence relating to what it requires is found in the context of implied 
covenant disputes between lessors and lessees. The descriptions of the 
reasonably prudent operator standard found in those cases does not shed 
much additional light on what the standard requires. The jurisprudence 
merely suggests that the reasonably prudent operator standard requires an 
Operator to take the steps that a reasonably prudent operator would take 
in the same circumstances.
As a general rule, a non-operator who asserts that the Operator has 
breached the reasonably prudent operator standard will need expert 
testimony. Under certain facts, it might be clear to the average factfinder 
that an Operator’s conduct does not satisfy this standard, but generally the 
average juror or judge will not know what is required of a reasonably 
prudent operator. For example, in Bonn Operating Co. v. Devon Energy 
Production Co., a federal district court in Texas expressly concluded that 
expert testimony would be needed to establish whether the Operator failed 
to act as a reasonably prudent operator, thereby breaching the good and 
workmanlike manner standard under an operating agreement.120 This 
conclusion is consistent with court decisions that a lessor-plaintiff needs 
expert testimony in order to establish that a lessee has breached implied 
covenant duties under a lease (implied covenant duties are evaluated based 
on a reasonably prudent operator standard).
If parties find themselves in a dispute regarding whether the Operator 
met the required standard of care, the parties can look to previously-
decided cases for some guidance, but the circumstances faced by the 
parties may not be a close match to the circumstances found in the 
available cases. Further, the question of whether the Operator met the 
standard of care is a factual question, and, even if the circumstances of the 
                                                                                                            
120. 2009 WL 484218 (N.D. Tex.); The parties in Bonn Operating used the 
1956 version of the AAPL Form 610.
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parties’ dispute happens to be a reasonably-close match for the facts of a 
prior case, the factfinder in the parties’ dispute could reach a different 
conclusion than the factfinder in the prior case. 
Finally, although the discussion immediately above talks about parties 
disputing whether the Operator has met its obligations to conduct 
operations in a “good and workmanlike manner,” it is noteworthy that the 
exculpatory clause found in many joint operating agreements will shield 
the Operator from liability to the Non-Operators unless the seriousness of 
the Operator’s lapse is much more severe than a mere failure to satisfy the 
“good and workmanlike manner standard.” A later section of this Article 
will discuss exculpatory clauses.
B. Attempts to Hold Operator to Fiduciary or Other Heightened 
Standards
Non-operators sometimes attempt to hold Operators to heightened 
duties, such as a fiduciary duty.121 Typically, they do this by arguing that 
the relationship between the parties carries with it either fiduciary duties 
or some heightened duty of loyalty. Because agents generally owe a 
fiduciary duty to their principal,122 the principal-agency relationship is the 
example of such a duty.123
Another way Non-Operators can argue that the Operator owes 
fiduciary duties is by asserting that either the joint operating agreement, 
the parties’ conduct, or both, establishes some relationship between all the 
parties such that all parties owe fiduciary duties to one another. Such an 
                                                                                                            
121. A fiduciary duty is “[a] duty to act for someone else’s benefit, while 
subordinating one’s personal interest to that of the other person.” Fiduciary Duty, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990). The Rocky Mountain Mineral Law 
Foundation has previously published several excellent articles on joint operating 
agreements, including some that discuss arguments regarding whether an operator 
is subject to a fiduciary duty. See, e.g., Patrick H. Martin, Gas Balancing and Split 
Stream Sales Under Joint Operating Agreements and Unit Operating Agreements,
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. FDN. SPECIAL INST. ON ONSHORE POOLING AND 
UNITIZATION (2008).
122. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 13 (“An agent is a fiduciary with 
respect to matters within the scope of his agency.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
AGENCY § 8.01 (“An agent has a fiduciary duty to act loyally for the principal's 
benefit in all matters connected with the agency relationship.”); Johnson v. 
Brewer & Pritchard, P.C., 73 S.W.3d 193, 200 (Tex. 2002); Basile v. H & R 
Block, Inc., 761 A.2d 1115, 1120 (Pa. 2000); Burlington Northern and Santa Fe 
Ry. Co. v. Burlington Resources Oil & Gas Co., 590 N.W.2d 433, 437 (N.D. 
1999).
123. Section IV(A) of this Article discusses issues relating to whether the 
Operator could be classified as an agent for purposes of all work it performs on 
behalf of the Non-Operators. Section IV(B) of this Article discusses whether the 
Operator could be classified as an agent for limited purposes.
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argument, if successful, would impose the same duty on all the parties, 
rather than some special duty on the Operator. The existence of such a duty 
could be particularly significant for the Operator; as the party that conducts 
operations and bears certain other duties, the operator is most likely to be 
on the “receiving end” of a breach of fiduciary duty claim.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to provide a worldwide survey of 
the various laws and business relationships that can establish heightened 
duties between parties. Below, however, this Article gives an overview of 
the elements necessary to establish a partnership, mining partnership, or 
joint venture124 within the United States, followed by a brief discussion of 
efforts by the AAPL Form 610 and other model forms to avoid the creation 
of such relationships. The potential existence of such entities is important 
because parties to those relationships often owe heightened duties to one 
another.
1. Elements of Partnerships, Mining Partnerships, and Joint 
Ventures
The elements necessary to establish a partnership, mining partnership, 
or joint venture have certain similarities. For each of the three, a critical 
element is the right of control, as can be seen by examining the elements 
of a partnership.
a. Elements of a Partnership
Partnership law is now governed by statute in all 50 states. It appears 
that all states other than Louisiana have adopted some version of the 
Uniform Partnership Act, and, in Louisiana, partnerships are governed by 
the Louisiana Civil Code.125 But the statutes governing partnerships—like 
the common law that previously governed partnerships—impose high 
standards of conduct upon partners. As a general rule, partners owe 
                                                                                                            
124. Within the United States, “joint venture” typically means a business 
relationship that is akin to a partnership, except that a “joint venture” generally is 
entered for a single business deal or a specific area or for a limited time. This 
Article acknowledges that, outside the U.S., some people may use “joint venture”
differently.
125. See, e.g., Ingram v. Deere, 288 S.W.3d 886, 894-5 (Tex. 2009) (stating 
that Uniform Partnership Act had been adopted by all states other than Louisiana 
and discussing, under Texas law, the change).
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fiduciary duties and duties of loyalty to one another,126 and they are agents 
of the partnership.127
State law governs whether a partnership exists, but the elements or 
factors necessary to create a partnership tend to be similar from one state 
to another. The intent of the parties is an important element, but the 
creation of a partnership does not necessarily depend on whether the 
parties subjectively intended to form one.128 The critical factor with 
respect to intent is whether the parties intended to create a business 
relationship that contains the characteristics of a partnership—a business 
carried on jointly for purposes of profit.129 In some states—such as Kansas, 
New Mexico, and Oklahoma—statutes provide that “the association of 
two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit forms 
a partnership.”130 In some other oil and gas states—such as Colorado, 
North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wyoming—the statutes governing 
partnerships use very similar language in specifying what constitutes a 
partnership.131 But co-ownership of property and a sharing of profits made 
by use of the property alone are not sufficient to create a partnership.132 To 
constitute a partnership, each owner must have a right of control.133
                                                                                                            
126. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 2809; N.M. § 54-1A-404; OHIO REV. CODE
§ 1776.44; 54 OKLA. STAT. § 1-404; 15 PA. CONSOL. STAT. § 8447; WYO. STAT.
§ 17-21-404. Under the Texas statutes governing partnerships, the duties are not 
explicitly called “fiduciary” duties, but there are duties of loyalty, TEX. BUS. ORG.
CODE § 152.205, and of good faith, TEX. BUS. ORG. CODE § 152.204(b), and these 
duties generally cannot be waived. TEX. BUS. ORG. CODE § 152.002. Other states, 
even those that refer to the existence of “fiduciary” duties, may also provide 
expressly for duties of loyalty, good faith, and fair dealing that cannot be waived. 
See, e.g., 54 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1-103 (bar on waiver of certain duties), 1-404 (duty 
of loyalty, good faith, and fair dealing). 
127. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-60-109; LA. CIV. CODE art. 2809; N.M. 
§ 54-1A-301; OHIO REV. CODE § 1776.31; 54 OKLA. ST. § 1-301; TEX. BUS. ORG.
CODE § 152.301; WYO. STAT. § 17-21-301.
128. Ziegler v. Dahl, 691 N.W.2d 271, 275 (N.D. 2005); Hillme v. Chastain, 
75 S.W.3d 315, 317 (Mo. App. 2002).
129. Id.
130. 54 OKLA. STAT. § 1-202; N.M. STAT. § 54-1A-202; KAN. STAT. § 56a-202.
131. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-60-106 (definition of “partnership”), 7-60-107 
(rules for determining whether a partnership exists); N.D. CENT. CODE § 45-13-
01; OHIO REV. CODE § 1776.01; 15 PA. CONSOL. STAT. § 8412 (nature of 
partnership); TEX. BUS. ORG. CODE § 152.051; WYO. STAT. 17-21-101.
132. 54 OKLA. STAT. § 1-202; N.M. STAT. § 54-1A-202; KAN. STAT. § 56a-202.
133. Ziegler v. Dahl, 691 N.W.2d 271, 275 (N.D. 2005); Al-Yassin v. Al-
Yassin, 2004 WL 625757 *7 (Cal. App. 2004); Tarnavsky v. Tarnavsky, 147 F.3d 
674, 677-8 (8th Cir. 1998) (an element necessary for creation of a partnership is 
“power of control in the management of the business;” North Dakota law); In re 
Stewart, 1990 WL 10593999 *3 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1990); cf. Hillme v. Chastain, 
75 S.W.3d 315, 317 (Mo. App. 2002) (“A voice in the management of the 
partnership enterprise . . . [is an] indication[] of a partnership”).
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Under Texas law, courts consider a list of five factors—none of which 
are determinative—in evaluating whether a partnership exists.134 Factors
that weigh in favor of concluding that persons have created a partnership 
include the fact they have: (1) received or have the right to share in the 
profits of a business; (2) expressed an intent to be partners; (3) participated 
or have the right to participate in control of the business; (4) have shared 
or agreed to share losses and liabilities; and (5) contributed or agreed to 
contribute money or profit into the business.135 Texas statutory law 
specifically states that the mere fact that a mineral interest is governed by 
a joint operating agreement will not establish a partnership.136
Louisiana law provides that “[a] partnership is a juridical person, 
distinct from its partners, created by a contract between two or more 
persons to combine their efforts or resources in determined proportions 
and to collaborate at mutual risk for their common profit or commercial 
benefit.”137 The terms of most joint operating agreements would satisfy the 
majority of terms included within that definition, but Louisiana law 
expressly provides that an oil and gas joint operating agreement “does not 
create a partnership unless the contract expressly so provides.”138
In many jurisdictions, a disclaimer of partnership will not necessarily 
be determinative, but it should be helpful in preventing parties from being 
deemed partners when they do not wish to be. This is particularly true with 
respect to the duties the parties owe one another. If the parties do not wish 
to be partners, there is no reason that the law should impose upon them 
partnership duties vis-à-vis one another. Further, the level of control that 
most joint operating agreements give to the Operator may preclude the 
joint right of management that is necessary for the existence of a 
partnership. 
                                                                                                            
134. Ingram, 288 S.W.3d at 895.
135. TEX. BUS. ORG. CODE § 152.052.
136. TEX. BUS. ORG. CODE § 152.052(b)(4).
137. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2801. Louisiana is largely a civil law or mixed 
jurisdiction, even though it is part of the United States, where the common law 
has predominated historically. The civil law has been more receptive to treating 
partnerships as an entity. Harry G. Henn and John R. Alexander, LAWS OF 
CORPORATIONS § 9 at pp. 16-19 (West Publishing 3rd ed. 1983). The common 
law applied the “aggregate” theory to partnerships. Id. Under that theory, a 
partnership created a relationship between individuals—a relationship that had 
certain consequences—but a partnership was not a separate juridical entity. But 
now, all 49 states other than Louisiana have adopted some version of the Uniform 
Partnership Act, and that Act largely treats partnerships as entities.
138. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:215. Depending on the meaning of “collaborate” and 
the terms of a particular joint operating agreement, the “collaborat[ion]” element 
might not be satisfied. Thus, even without LA. REV. STAT. § 31:215, the parties to 
a joint operating agreement would not necessarily have a partnership.
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b. Elements of a Mining Partnership
Members of a mining partnership generally owe fiduciary duties to 
one another.139 Whether a mining partnership exists is an issue of fact, but 
the elements or factors necessary to establish a mining partnership are a 
matter of state law.140 In Oklahoma, there are three elements of a mining 
partnership: (1) a joint interest in the property; (2) an express or implied 
agreement to share in profits and losses; and (3) cooperation in the 
project.141 Under Oklahoma law, “cooperation in the project” means 
“actively joining in the promotion, conduct or management” of a 
project.142 The mere fact that an interest is governed by a joint operating 
agreement is not sufficient to create a mining partnership.143 Such actions 
as “[r]eceiving reports, questioning bills, and hiring a pumper to evaluate 
[a] well in contemplation of taking over as operator” do not constitute 
“cooperation in the project.”144
Much of the jurisprudence relating to whether a mining partnership 
exists is brought by third persons who seek to have all the co-owners held 
liable for the torts or contracts of one of the co-owners (usually the 
operator), opposed to being cases brought by a co-owner seeking to hold 
the Operator liable as a fiduciary. Often, the existence or non-existence of 
a mining partnership turns on whether all of the co-owners had a right to 
control operations. In the absence of such a right, a court generally will 
find that a mining partnership does not exist. And often courts have found 
that a mining partnership does not exist because non-operators lacked the 
right to control operations.
c. Elements of a Joint Venture
A joint venture is similar to a partnership. The primary distinction 
between a partnership and a joint venture “is that, while a [partnership] is 
ordinarily formed for the transaction of a general business of a particular 
kind, a joint venture is usually, but not necessarily, limited to a single 
transaction, although the business of conducting it to a successful 
                                                                                                            
139. Bufalini v. De Michelis, 288 P.2d 934, 937 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955); Smith 
v. Bolin, 261 S.W.2d 352, 363 (Tex. App. 1953), aff’d in part and rev’d in part,
271 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. 1954).
140. Spark Bros. Drilling Co. v. Texas Moran Exploration Co., 829 P.2d 951, 
953 (Okla. 1991).
141. Id.
142. Id.; see also Jenkins v. Pappas, 383 P.2d 645, 647 (Okla. 1963).
143. See Spark Bros. Drilling Co., 829 P.2d 951 at 953.
144. Id. at 954.
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termination may continue for a number of years.”145 Because joint 
ventures are essentially partnerships for a limited purpose, joint ventures 
generally are governed by the same rules that govern partnerships.146
Accordingly, parties to a joint venture owe each other fiduciary duties, just 
as partners owe each other fiduciary duties.147
The mere facts that parties co-own an oil and gas lease and that they 
have agreed that one co-owner will operate the lease on the parties’ behalf 
are not sufficient to create a joint venture.148 On the other hand, the 
existence of a joint operating agreement will not automatically preclude 
the existence of a joint venture. In some cases, courts have found that a 
joint venture existed.149 In other cases, courts have determined that a joint 
                                                                                                            
145. Daily States Publishing Co. v. Uhalt, 126 So. 228, 231 (La. 1930). See also
Ben Fitzgerald Realty Co. v. Muller, 846 S.W.2d 110, 120 (Tex. App. – Tyler 1993) 
(“The principle distinction between a joint venture and a partnership is that a joint 
venture is usually limited to one particular enterprise.”); Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. 
Hawkins Oil & Gas, Inc., 668 S.W.2d 16, 16 (Ark. 1984) (“[A] joint venture is ‘in 
the nature of a partnership of a limited character.”) (quoting Johnson v. Lion Oil 
Company, 216 Ark. 736, 739 (Ark. 1950)); Boles v. Akers, 244 P. 182, 184 (Okla. 
1925) (“A joint venture generally relates to a single transaction.”); Bebo Const. Co. 
v. Mattox & O’Brien, P.C., 998 P.2d 475, 477 (Colo. App. 2000) (“A joint venture 
is a partnership formed for a limited purpose . . . .”); SPW Assocs., LLP v. Anderson, 
718 N.W. 2d 580, 583 (N.D. 2006) (“A joint venture is generally considered akin 
to a partnership, although more limited in scope and duration….”); Lightsey v. 
Marshall, 128 N.M. 353, 357, 992 P.2d 904, 908 (N.M. App. 1999) (“a joint venture 
‘is generally considered to be a partnership for a single transaction’”); Madrid v. 
Norton, 596 P.2d 1108, 1118 (Wyo. 1979) (“The principal distinction between a 
joint venture and a partnership is that a joint venture usually relates to a single 
transaction.”); see also Henn, supra note 137, § 49 at 105. 
146. SPW Assocs., LLP v. Anderson, 718 N.W.2d 580, 583 (N.D. 2006); Ben 
Fitzgerald Realty Co. v. Muller, 846 S.W.2d 110, 120 (Tex. App. 1993); Cajun 
Elec. Power Co-Op, Inc. v. McNamara, 452 So. 2d 212, 215 (La. App. 1984); 
Boles v. Akers, 244 P. 182, 184 (Okla. 1925); Madrid v. Norton, 596 P.2d 1108, 
1118 (Wyo. 1979); see also Henn, supra note 137, § 49 at 107. 
147. Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Hawkins Oil & Gas, Inc., 668 S.W.2d 16, 17 
(Ark. 1984); Rankin v. Naftalis, 557 S.W.2d 940, 944 (Tex. 1977); Madrid v. 
Norton, 596 P.2d 1108, 1118 (Wyo. 1979); see also Henn, supra note 137, § 49 
at p. 107. 
148. Hamilton v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 648 S.W.2d 316, 320 (Tex. App. 
1982) (“Joint owners of an oil and gas lease, may contract for the operation of 
leases by one of them and for the operator, in the event of success, to pay to the 
other joint owners one-half of the proceeds of the sale of the oil and gas less the 
expenses of finding it, without creating a joint venture or a mining partnership.”).
149. Rankin v. Naftalis, 557 S.W.2d 940, 944 (Tex. 1977) (parties were “joint 
venturers for the development of a particular oil and gas lease;” nevertheless, 
plaintiffs were denied recovery because joint venture did not extend to the 
property that was at issue in the litigation). As one commentator noted, “the mere 
existence of an agreement between an operator and non-operator is not sufficient 
to avoid [the existence of a fiduciary] duty.” Christopher S. Kulander, Old Faves 
and New Raves: How Case Law Has Affected Form Joint Operating Agreements—
114 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VII
venture did not exist.150 State law determines the elements necessary to 
create a joint venture, but whether a joint venture exists in any particular 
case will be a fact issue that depends on the terms of the parties’ agreement 
and perhaps on their conduct.151
In Texas, four elements are necessary for the existence of a joint 
venture: (1) a community of interest in the venture; (2) an agreement to 
share profits; (3) an agreement to share losses; and (4) a mutual right of 
control or management of the enterprise.152 A community of interest is 
defined under Texas law as “a commonly shared incentive between the 
parties as to the progress and goals of the joint venturers.”153 Under most 
joint operating agreements, at least three of the four elements of a joint 
venture will exist—a community of interest, an agreement to share profits, 
and an agreement to share losses. Accordingly, if parties dispute whether 
a joint venture exists, the determining issue often will be whether the 
parties have a mutual right of control and management.154 A mere right to 
receive information or to visit the drill site is not sufficient control to 
support the existence of a joint venture.155
In Oklahoma, three elements are needed to establish a joint venture: 
“1) A joint interest in property (the contributions need not be equal or of 
the same character), 2) An express or implied agreement to share profits 
and losses of the venture, 3) Action or conduct showing cooperation in the 
venture.”156 Under Colorado law, the elements necessary to establish a 
                                                                                                            
Problems and Solutions (Part One), 1 OIL AND GAS, NAT. RES., AND ENERGY J. 1, 
11 (2015). Instead, courts will consider whether the terms of the agreement “create[] 
a partnership, joint venture, or agency relationship that may trigger a fiduciary 
duty.” Id.
150. Ayco Development Corp. v. G.E.T. Service Co., 616 S.W.2d 184, 186 
(Tex. 1981); Hamilton v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 648 S.W.2d 316, 321 (Tex. App. 
El Paso 1982).
151. Grand Isle Campsites, Inc. v. Cheek, 262 So. 2d 350 (La. 1972); Cajun 
Elec. Power Co-Op, Inc. v. McNamara, 452 So. 2d 212, 216 (La. App. 1984); see
also Price v. Howard, 236 P.3d 82, 91 (Okla. 2010) (existence is a question of 
fact); Madrid v. Norton, 596 P.2d 1108, 1118 (Wyo. 1979) (question of fact). The 
agreement that supports the existence of a joint venture can be either express or 
implied. Pillsbury Mills, Inc. v. Chehardy, 90 So. 2d 797, 801 (La. 1956).
152. Ayco Development Corp. v. G.E.T. Service Co., 616 S.W.2d 184, 186 
(Tex. 1981); Hamilton v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 648 S.W.2d 316, 321 (Tex. App. 
1982).
153. Metroplexcore, L.L.C. v. Parsons Transp., Inc., 743 F.3d 964, 973 (5th 
Cir. 2014) (quoting Ballard v. United States, 17 F.3d 116, 118 (5th Cir. 1994)).
154. This has been the decisive issue in several cases. See, e.g., Ayco 
Development Corp. v. G.E.T. Service Co., 616 S.W.2d 184, 186 (Tex. 1981); 
Hamilton v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 648 S.W.2d 316, 321 (Tex. App. 1982) (no 
joint venture because operator “had full control of all operations”).
155. Ayco Development Corp. v. G.E.T. Service Co., 616 S.W.2d 184, 186 
(Tex. 1981).
156. McGee v. Alexander. 37 P.3d 800, 806-7 (Okla. 2001).
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joint venture are essentially the same. Courts have stated that a party must 
prove the existence of three elements in order to show that a joint venture 
exists—“(1) A joint interest in the property; (2) an agreement, express or 
implied, to share in the losses or profits of the venture; and (3) actions or 
conduct showing cooperation in the project. No one of these elements 
alone is sufficient.”157 The law is very similar in most other states.158 Thus, 
whether or not the non-operators have a right of control tends to be the 
deciding issue in disputes regarding whether a joint venture exists.
Based on the non-operator’s lack of control, courts often have found 
that a joint venture did not exist, but, in some cases, courts have found that 
the parties’ relationship constituted a joint venture. If a joint venture exists, 
one of the consequences of the fiduciary duty or duty or loyalty owed by 
each co-owner could be a duty not to compete with the joint venture. In 
Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Hawkins Oil & Gas, Inc., the heirs of Alexander 
B. Hamilton granted oil and gas leases to Hawkins Oil & Gas, Inc. 
(“Hawkins”) covering certain areas in “Section 6” that had been owned by 
Hamilton.159 Later, Hawkins entered a joint operating agreement with 
Texas Oil & Gas Corp. (“Texas”). Texas also held leases covering land in 
Section 6, and it became Operator. Later, Texas discovered that the 
Hamilton heirs did not own the minerals in the land covered by the lease 
they had granted to Hawkins. Instead, Hamilton’s widow owned the 
minerals. Without telling Hawkins that its lessors lacked title to the 
minerals purportedly leased to Hawkins, Texas acquired leases from the 
heirs of Hamilton’s widow. 
After discovering what Texas had done, Hawkins filed suit in 
Arkansas asserting that the parties’ joint operating agreement created a 
                                                                                                            
157. Breckenridge Co. v. Swales Management Corp., 522 P.2d 737, 739 (Colo. 
1974).
158. Under North Dakota law, four elements must be present to form a joint 
venture, namely “(1) contribution by the parties of money, property, time, or skill 
in some common undertaking, but the contributions need not be equal or of the 
same nature; (2) a proprietary interest and right of mutual control over the engaged 
property; (3) an express or implied agreement for the sharing of profits, and 
usually, but not necessarily, of losses; and (4) an express or implied contract 
showing a joint venture was formed.” SPW Assocs., LLP v. Anderson, 718 N.S.2d 
580, 583 (N.D. 2006).
In New Mexico, a joint adventure is formed when parties enter an agreement that 
they will (1) combine their resources into a particular business deal, (2) share 
profits, (3) share losses, and (4) have the mutual right of control over the subject 
matter of the enterprise. Fullerton v. Kaune, 382 P.2d 529, 532 (N.M. 1963). 
One treatise states that most authorities would agree on four elements that are 
necessary to create a joint venture: (1) an agreement, express or inferred; (2) a 
joint interest (contribution); (3) a sharing of profits and usually of losses, with 
unlimited liability; and (4) a mutual right of control. See Henn, supra note 137 §
49 at p. 17.
159. 668 S.W.2d 16 (Ark. 1984).
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joint venture, that joint venturers owe fiduciary duties to one another, and 
that Texas had breached its duty when it purchased for itself alone an 
interest in the subject matter of the joint venture. Accordingly, the 
Arkansas Supreme Court held that Hawkins was entitled to a one-half 
interest in the leases Texas acquired from the widow’s heirs.160
2. Model Form Efforts to Avoid Partnership, Mining Partnership, or 
Joint Venture
Parties typically want their joint operating agreement to govern their 
obligations with respect to one another. They wish to avoid having the law 
impose the sort of heightened standards of conduct associated with 
partnerships, fiduciary relationships, and principal-agent relationships.
Similarly, they do not want to be directly liable to third persons for the acts 
of other parties to the joint operating agreement, and the existence of a 
partnership could result in direct liability to third persons.
Accordingly, the 2015 and 1989 versions of AAPL Form 610 
expressly disclaim any intent to create a partnership, mining partnership, 
or joint venture.161 The 1982 and 1977 Forms expressly disclaim any intent 
to create a “mining or other partnership or association.”162 The 1982 and 
1977 Forms do not expressly refer to joint ventures, but the Forms’ 
disclaimer should be interpreted as effectively disclaiming any intent to 
create a joint venture given the fact that a joint venture is essentially a 
partnership for a limited purpose (as noted above), and given those Forms’ 
disclaimer of an intent to create a partnership or other “association.” The 
AAPL Offshore Forms contain similar provisions, as does Rocky 
Mountain Form 3, which similarly disclaims any intent to form a 
partnership, mining partnership, or joint venture.163
Model forms used outside the United States contain similar 
provisions. The 2012 AIPN Form states that the parties’ relationship is 
“contractual only and shall not be construed as creating a partnership or 
other recognized association.”164 AMPLA disclaims any intent to create a 
partnership,165 and the CAPL Form states that the parties are not creating 
a “partnership or association of any kind,” and instead hold their interests 
as “tenants in common, subject to those modifications expressly provided 
under this Agreement,” and that they are not intending to create 
                                                                                                            
160. Id.
161. 2015 AAPL 610 art. VII.A; 1989 AAPL 610 art. VII.A.
162. 1982 AAPL 610 art. VII.A; 1977 AAPL 610 art. VII.A.
163. AAPL 710 art. 19.1; AAPL 810 art. 22.1; Rocky Mountain Form 3 art. 
16.1.
164. 2012 AIPN art. 9.3.B.8.
165. AMPLA cl. 3.3(f).
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partnership duties or fiduciary duties, except for duties relating to 
commingling of funds and maintaining confidential information.166 The 
UKCS Form states that the parties are not creating “any mining 
partnership, commercial partnership or other partnership.”167
Under the law of some jurisdictions, a disclaimer of any intent to 
create a particular relationship may not be sufficient to avoid creating such 
a relationship if the facts and circumstances satisfy the elements needed to 
create such a relationship,168 but the parties’ express disclaimer should be 
given some weight, particularly with respect to their rights and duties vis-
à-vis one another. Further, as discussed in more detail in the section of this 
Article that discusses the relationship of the Operator to the Non-
Operators, the AAPL Forms vest in the Operator the right and duty to 
conduct all operations, and provide that the Operator is not subject to the 
direction or control of the Non-Operators. In most cases, the Non-
Operators’ lack of the right to control operations likely will prevent the 
creation of a partnership, mining partnership, or joint venture.169
IV. RELATIONSHIP OF OPERATOR TO NON-OPERATORS
As already noted, joint operating agreements typically attempt to 
avoid the creation of a partnership or joint venture between the parties.
Many joint operating agreements also attempt to control the legal nature 
of the relationship between the Operator and the Non-Operators. The 
agreements do so in two major ways. First, they attempt to ensure that the 
Operator will be classified as an independent contractor, rather than as an 
agent of the parties. Second, they seek to ensure that the Operator serves 
on a no-gain and no-loss basis.
A. Independent Contractor Status and Avoiding Principal-Agency 
Relationship
Most operating agreements used in North America attempt to classify 
the Operator as an independent contractor, rather than as an agent of the 
Non-Operators. Some other operating agreements characterize the 
Operator as the agent of the Non-Operators.
                                                                                                            
166. CAPL cl. 1.05(A).
167. UKCS cl. 22.2.1.
168. This is certainly true in the United States. See infra note 177. Further, it 
may be true outside the U.S. as well. CAPL cl. 1.05 states that “the Parties 
recognize [their contractual clause disclaiming any partnership, trust relationship, 
or fiduciary relationship] might not prevent such a trust, trust duty or fiduciary 
relationship being imposed at law or in equity.”
169. See, e.g., Burlington Resources, Inc. v. United National Ins. Co., 481 
F.Supp. 2d 567, 574 (E.D. La. 2007).
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1. The North American Forms—AAPL and CAPL
Most of the operating agreements used in North America contain 
provisions that attempt to ensure that the Operator will be classified as an
independent contractor of the Non-Operators, not an agent of the Non-
Operators, for purposes of the work that the Operator performs. Avoiding 
a principal-agency relationship serves two purposes. First, it helps protect 
the Non-Operators from direct liability to third persons for the contracts 
and torts of the Operator. As a general rule, a principal is liable to third 
persons for the torts committed170 and the contracts entered by171 an agent 
within the scope of his agency, but a person generally is not liable to third 
persons for the acts of an independent contractor, provided that the person 
has not maintained direction and control over the contractor’s work.172
Second, avoiding a principal-agency relationship can help ensure that 
the Operator’s obligations are generally governed by the terms of the 
operating agreement, rather than by rules that might be imposed as a matter 
of law if the Operator were considered an agent. For example, an agent 
generally owes a fiduciary duty to its principal.173 A fiduciary duty generally 
has “[a] duty to act for someone else’s benefit, while subordinating one’s 
personal interest to that of the other person,” and such a high level of duty 
is generally not consistent with the intent of the parties to a joint operating 
agreement.174 In contrast to an agent, an independent contractor generally 
does not owe fiduciary duties.175
There are at least three ways in which a joint operating agreement can 
seek to have an Operator classified as an independent contractor of the 
Non-Operators, rather than as an agent. Namely, the agreement can: (1) 
expressly characterize the Operator as an “independent contractor”; (2) 
expressly disclaim the existence of a principal-agent relation; and (3) give 
the Operator a degree of control over operations that is characteristic of an 
                                                                                                            
170. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) AGENCY § 7.04; Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. 
Castegnaro, 772 A.2d 456, 460 (Pa. 2001); Marron v. Helmecke, 67 P.2d 1034, 
1035 (Colo. 1937).
171. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) AGENCY §§ 6.01-6.03.
172. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS §§ 409, 414; Fleck v. ANG Coal 
Gasification Co. 522 N.W.2d 445, 447 (N.D. 1994).
173. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 13 (“An agent is a fiduciary with 
respect to matters within the scope of his agency.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
AGENCY § 8.01 (“An agent has a fiduciary duty to act loyally for the principal's 
benefit in all matters connected with the agency relationship.”); Johnson v. Brewer 
& Pritchard. P.C., 73 S.W.3d 193, 200 (Tex. 2002); Basile v. H & R Block, Inc. 761 
A.2d 1115, 1120 (Pa. 2000); Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. 
Burlington Resources Oil & Gas Co., 590 N.W.2d 433, 437 (N.D. 1999).
174. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th edition 1990).
175. Horwitz v. Holabair & Root, 816 N.E.2d 272, 285-6 (Ill. 2004).
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independent contractor, rather than an agent. The two most recent versions 
of the AAPL Form 610 do each of these three things.
First, Articles V.A of the 2015 and 1989 Forms state, “In its 
performance of services hereunder for the Non-Operators, Operator shall
be an independent contractor . . . .” Readers should note, however, that 
merely declaring in an agreement that one party is an independent 
contractor, rather than an agent, will not necessarily be determinative of 
the nature of the parties’ relationship. Courts sometimes will consider the 
parties’ intent regarding the nature of their relationship,176 but courts often 
will look to the substantive terms of a contract’s terms to determine whether 
those terms satisfy the elements of a principal-agency relationship, rather 
than simply accepting the characterization that the parties choose to 
adopt.177
Further, the same sentence expressly characterizing the Operator as an 
independent contractor also gives the Operator a degree of control that is 
characteristic of an independent contractor. The full sentence reads: “In its 
performance of services hereunder for the Non-Operators, Operator shall 
be an independent contractor not subject to the control or direction of the 
Non-Operators except as to the type of operation to be undertaken in 
accordance with the election procedures contained in this agreement.” The 
major distinction between an independent contractor and an agent is that 
                                                                                                            
176. For example, in In re Great Western Drilling, Ltd., 211 S.W.3d 828, 841 
(Tex. App. – Eastland 2006), the court stated: “The JOAs gave Great Western full 
control of all operations in the contract area and recognized that it was an 
independent contractor not subject to the control or direction of the working 
interest owners.” Thus, the court seemed to give some weight to the parties’ 
characterization of the relationship. This may contrast with Burlington Resources, 
Inc. v. United National Ins. Co, 481 F. Supp. 2d 567, 574 (E.D. La. 2007). In 
Burlington Resources, the court quoted language stating: Operator “shall conduct 
and direct and have full control of all operations on the Contract Area as 
permitted and required by, and within the limits of this agreement. In its 
performance of services hereunder for the Non-Operators [Burlington], Operator 
shall be an independent contractor not subject to the control or direction of the 
Non-Operators except as to the type of operation to be undertaken . . . .” (emphasis 
in original). Thus, the court deliberately chose to emphasize the provisions 
relating to direction and control, while not emphasizing the parties’ 
characterization of their relationship. 
177. One oil and gas professor said: “[I]t is not possible to make what is in fact 
a ‘cat’ into a ‘dog’ by merely labeling it a ‘dog.’ If the factual attributes point 
towards ‘cat,’ we have a ‘cat,’ not a ‘dog.’” David E. Pierce, Evolution of Joint 
Operations in the oil and Gas Industry, RCKY. MTN. MIN. L. FOUND. *2-19 
Special Inst. On Joint Operation and the New AAPL Form 610-2015 Model Form 
Operating Agreement (2017); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) AGENCY § 1.01 
(“An agency relationship arises only when the elements stated in § 1.01 are 
present. Whether a relationship is characterized as agency in an agreement 
between parties or in the context of industry or popular usage is not controlling.”)
& § 101 cmt. (c).
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an agent is subject to the principal’s direction and control, whereas an 
independent contractor generally is not.178
The next sentence of Article V.A goes on to state that the “Operator 
shall not be deemed, or hold itself out as, the agent of the Non-Operators 
with authority to bind them to any obligation or liability assumed or 
incurred by Operator to any third party.”179 The Offshore AAPL Forms 
and CAPL Form contain similar provisions.180
The older versions of the AAPL Form 610 do not expressly refer to 
the Operator as an independent contractor, but those forms provide that 
the Operator will “conduct and direct and have full control of all 
operations.”181 Such freedom from direction and control by a principal is 
characteristic of an independent contractor. The two AAPL Forms 
designed to be offshore operating agreements expressly provide that the 
Operator is an “independent contractor, not subject to the control or 
direction of Non-Operating Parties.”182 The CAPL Form, which often is 
used in Canada, also characterizes the Operator as an independent 
contractor.183
As a general rule, parties to joint operating agreements seem to be 
successful in avoiding having the Operator classified as an agent of the 
non-operators.184 Indeed, there seem to be relatively few cases in which 
                                                                                                            
178. Enterprise Mgt. Consultants, Inc. v. State, 768 P.2d 359, 362 n.13 (Okla. 
1988); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 1. Of course, the person who hires an 
independent contractor does choose the job that will be done.
179. Article V.A. The 1989 Agreement has language identical to that quoted 
above. However, in the 2015 Form, Article V.A. goes on to provide a narrow 
exception to this rule. Namely, the Non-Operators appoint the Operator as their 
agent for purposes of executing or filing documents relating to pooling or 
unitization. This exception is not listed in the 1989 Form. 
See also AAPL 710 art. 5.1; AAPL 810 art. 5.1 (“The Operator is not the agent or 
fiduciary of the Non-Operator Parties.”); CAPL cl. 1.05(A) (excluding both 
agency relationships between parties and existence of fiduciary duties, except for 
limited purposes).
180. AAPL 710 art. 5.1 (“No Party shall be deemed to be, or hold itsef out as, 
the agent or fiduciary of another Party.”); AAPL 810 art. 5.1 (“The Operator is 
not the agent or fiduciary of the Non-Operator Parties.”); CAPL cl. 1.05(A) 
(excluding both agency relationships between parties and existence of fiduciary 
duties, except for limited purposes).
181. AAPL-610 (1982) art. V.A; AAPL-610 (1977) art. V.A; AAPL-610 
(1956) art. 5.
182. AAPL 710 (2002) art. 5.1; AAPL 810 (2007) art. 5.1 (“Operator is an 
independent contractor, not subject to the control or direction of Non-Operating 
Parties.”).
183. CAPL cl. 3.03.
184. In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig Deepwater Horizon in the Gulf of Mexico, on 
April 20, 2010, 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 963 (E.D. La. 2011); In re Great Western 
Drilling, Ltd., 211 S.W.3d 828, 841 (Tex. App. Eastland 2006); Burlington Resources, 
Inc. v. United National Ins. Co, 481 F. Supp. 2d 567, 574 (E.D. La. 2007).
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someone argues that, because the Operator conducts all operations, the 
Operator is an agent of the parties to the joint operating agreement.
Sometimes a third person argues that the non-operators are directly liable 
for torts or contracts of the Operator, but such arguments are typically 
based on an assertion that the joint operating agreement creates a joint 
venture, rather than on an assertion the Operator is an agent because it 
conducts all operations. Further, non-operators sometimes argue that the 
Operator owes them fiduciary duties or heightened duties of loyalty, but 
often such arguments are based on an assertion that the joint operating 
agreement creates a joint venture or that the Operator is an agent for some 
limited purpose, such as selling a non-operator’s share of production, 
rather than on an assertion that an Operator is a third party for all purposes.
2. Forms Used Outside North America
In contrast to the approach taken by most forms used in North 
America, the AMPLA Form refers to the Operator as being the “agent of 
the [Non-Operators] for purposes of this agreement.”185 The UKCS Form 
provides that the Operator will serve as the agent of the other parties in 
dealing with contractors.186 In contrast, however, AIPN Form 2012 states 
that the agreement “shall not be deemed or construed to authorize any 
Party to act as an agent . . . for any other Party for any purpose whatsoever 
except as explicitly set forth in this Agreement,” and that “the Parties shall 
not be considered fiduciaries except as expressly provided.”187
B. Agency Status for Limited Purposes Under Certain Model Forms
Even model forms that disclaim the existence of an agency 
relationship or fiduciary relationship in general may create such a 
relationship for limited purposes. For example, as noted earlier this 
Article, the 2015 version of AAPL Form 610 expressly designates the 
Operator as an agent for the limited purpose of executing, filing, and 
recording certain instruments relating to communitization or unitization.188
In addition, as previously noted, various versions of Form 610 recognize 
that the Operator has a duty to serve as custody of funds that Non-
                                                                                                            
185. AMPLA cl. 6.1; see also AMPLA cl. 7.1(a) (Operator is required to 
exercise its powers “as agent for and on behalf of” the Non-Operators.
186. UKCS cl. 6.5.8.
187. 2012 AIPN art. 14.1.
188. “Unitization” refers to “the joint operation of all or some portion of a 
producing reservoir,” see Patrick H. Martin and Bruce M. Kramer, MANUAL OF 
OIL AND GAS TERMS. The joint operation may come about by agreement or by 
order of an oil and gas regulator.” Communitization” refers to the same concept, 
but “communitization” often is used when federal lands are involved.
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Operators advance to the Operator, and that the Operator may have 
fiduciary duties with respect to those funds.189
Further, an agency relationship might be created if an Operator 
exercises its rights under a clause relating to the sale of product. The 
general rule under joint operating agreements is that each party has an 
obligation to take its share of production in kind and to arrange its sale or 
other disposition.190 The AAPL Forms generally provide, however, that if 
a Non-Operator fails to take its share or production in kind or to make its 
own arrangements to sell the product, the Operator has the right, though 
not the duty, to sell the product for the account of that Non-Operator.191
Some courts have concluded that, if the Operator sells products on behalf 
of a non-operator, then, in doing so, it serves as an agent of that non-
operator.192
C. Serving on a No-Gain, No-Loss Basis
The worldwide consensus view is that the Operator generally should 
neither gain a profit nor incur a loss because of its role as Operator.193 For
                                                                                                            
189. 2015 AAPL 610 art. V.D.4; 1989 AAPL 610 art. V.D.4.
190. 2015 AAPL 610 art. VI.G; 1989 AAPL 610 art. VI.G; 1982 AAPL art. 
VI.C; AAPL 710 art. 22.2; AAPL 810 art. 15.1; 2012 AIPN art. 9.1; AMPLA cl. 
4.3(a)(iii); CAPL cl. 6.01(A); UKCS cl. 18(b).
191. See, e.g., 2015 AAPL 610 art. VI.H; 1989 AAPL art. VI.G; 1982 AAPL 
art. VI.C; 1977 AAPL art. VI.C; AAPL 710 art. 22.3; AAPL 810 art. 15.3.
192. Atl. Richfield Co. v. The Long Trusts, 860 S.W.2d 439, 445 (Tex. App. 
Texarkana 1993).
193. This is made explicit in some international JOA forms. Article 4.2.B.5 of 
the AIPN 2012 Form provides that, subject to exceptions provided in the JOA’s 
accounting procedures or provisions for potential operator liability in the event of 
gross negligence or willful misconduct, the Operator should “neither gain a profit 
nor suffer a loss as a result of being the Operator.”
AMPLA cl. 6.3(a) provides that the Operator may charge the parties for certain 
“Operator Overhead” as specified by the parties in a Schedule 1, but Schedule 1 
states that this amount is designed to “reimburse without profit” the overhead 
expenses of the Operator. Further, clause 6.3(c) of the AMPLA Form states: “It is 
intended that the Operator will neither gain nor, except where it has committed 
fraud or willful misconduct, suffer a loss as a result of acting as Operator in the 
conduct of Joint Operations.”
Similarly, clause 6.2.2(d) of the UKCS Form states that, except in the case of 
willful misconduct, the Operator should “neither gain nor suffer a loss in such 
capacity as a result of acting as Operator in the conduct of Joint Operations.”
The no gain/no loss principle is not explicitly stated in the joint operating 
agreement forms commonly used in the U.S., but the AAPL forms implicitly 
incorporate this principle by providing that the parties to the JOA will generally 
share revenue and costs in proportion to their ownership fraction in the venture, 
the provisions in the AAPL forms that protect the Non-Operators against any self-
dealing by the Operator, and provisions in the accounting rules commonly used 
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this reason, the Operator is not compensated for its service as Operator. It 
is only entitled to reimbursement of its expenses, which may include a 
reasonable overhead, but otherwise it works “gratuitously for the benefit 
of all members of the JOA.”194 Further, certain provisions in the joint 
operating agreement that are designed to ensure that the Operator secures 
goods and services at a reasonable cost (these are discussed in Section 
II(B)(1) of this Article) include extra safeguards that apply if the Operator 
wishes to use its own materials and charge the joint account, or if it wishes 
to purchase services or materials from an affiliate. These measures seek to 
ensure that the Operator does not make money based on its service as 
Operator. This helps ensure that parties do not overpay for goods and 
services.
In addition, these measures help ensure that the Operator will make 
decisions based on what is best to ensure profitability of operations for all 
owners. If the Operator were allowed to make a profit on its work as 
Operator, there might be a conflict of interest between what is best for the 
parties as owners and what would produce the most profit for the 
Operator’s work.
The corollary of the no-gain concept is the no-loss concept. The 
Operator should be entitled to reimbursement for its costs, including a 
reasonable reimbursement for overhead. Further, as between the parties, 
the Operator should be protected from losses and liabilities arising from 
the Operator’s work as Operator. The AAPL joint operating agreement 
Forms typically provide such protection by providing a general rule that 
parties bear costs in proportion to their ownership interest, and that the 
parties’ liabilities are several, not joint or collective.195 In addition, the 
AAPL Forms each contain exculpatory clauses which provide that the 
Operator, in its role “as Operator,” generally will not be liable to the other 
parties for losses sustained or liabilities incurred.196 Forms used outside 
the United States also tend to contain exculpatory clauses.197
                                                                                                            
by JOA parties in the U.S., which allow the Operator to charge for overhead, but 
only to a defined extent. See 2005 COPAS Accounting Procedure, Section III.
194. Scott C. Styles, Joint Operating Agreements 375, found in OIL AND GAS 
LAW—CURRENT PRACTICE AND EMERGING TRENDS (Greg Gordon et al. eds., 2d 
ed. 2011).
195. See, e.g., art. VII.A in the 2015, 1989, 1982, and 1977 versions of AAPL 
Form 610. See also AAPL 710 arts. 8.1 and 19.1; AAPL 810 arts. 6.1 and 22.1.
196. The exculpatory clause is contained in art. V.A of the 2015, 1989, 1982, 
and 1977 versions of the AAPL Form 610, and in art. 5 of the 1956 Form. It is 
contained in art. 5.2 in both the AAPL Form 710 (2002) and the AAPL Form 810 
(2007).
197. See, e.g., AIPN art. 4.6; see also CAPL cl. 4.01 and 4.02; UKCS cl. 6.2.4; 
AMPLA cl. 6.5.
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As a general rule, the exculpatory protection provided to the Operator 
is not absolute. Common exceptions include liability relating to losses 
sustained or liability incurred when the loss or liability arises from gross 
negligence, willful misconduct, or a breach of specific terms of the joint 
operating agreement. 
D. Exculpatory Clauses
Joint operating agreements establish a general rule that each party 
bears a share of the expenses that arise from operations, with each party’s 
share being in proportion to their ownership interest.198 That expense-
sharing scheme would be disrupted if a party to the agreement was liable 
to the other parties for some loss or expense arising from joint operations.
The scheme also would be disrupted if one party incurred direct liability 
to third persons for some expense or loss arising from joint operations, and 
the other parties did not share direct liability, and they were excused, as 
between the parties, from paying their proportionate share of that expense. 
Because the Operator is the party that performs almost all activities 
necessary for joint operations, it is the Operator that has the greatest risk 
of incurring additional liability. 
To help preserve the general rule of proportionate liability, most joint 
operating agreements contain an “exculpatory clause” that protects the 
Operator from liability “as Operator” to the Non-Operators for either 
losses sustained by the parties or liabilities incurred to third persons in 
connection with joint operations. This exculpatory protection has three 
notable limitations. First, although the exculpatory clause protects the 
Operator from liability as between the parties for liabilities incurred to 
third persons, the exculpatory clause of course does not affect the 
Operator’s direct liability to third persons. Second, although the 
exculpatory clause protects the Operator from liability as Operator, the 
Operator still bears its proportionate share of liability in its role as one of 
the parties to the operating agreement.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, exculpatory clauses typically 
do not give the Operator unconditional protection. For example, 
exculpatory clauses typically do not protect the Operator from liability 
arising from the Operator’s gross negligence or willful misconduct.
The fact that the exculpatory clause does not provide unconditional 
protection creates the potential for disputes between the Operator and 
Non-Operators. One type of conflict involves factual disputes regarding 
whether particular action or inaction constituted gross negligence or 
                                                                                                            
198. See, for example, art. VII.A of the 2015, 1989, 1982, and 1977 versions 
of the AAPL Form 610.
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willful misconduct. But an issue that recently attracted more attention is 
whether the exculpatory clause’s protections apply to liabilities arising 
from activities that are not part of operations and to liabilities arising from 
the Operator’s alleged breach of some express duty.199 Different courts 
have reached different conclusions. The different conclusions have come 
about partly because different exculpatory clauses have different wording, 
but sometimes different courts have reached different conclusions even 
when considering the same language.
1. Model Forms Used in the U.S.
The language of the exculpatory clause in the AAPL Form 610 has 
changed multiple times. In the 1956 version, the exculpatory clause was 
part of the same sentence that established a standard of care. The sentence 
provided: “[The Operator] shall conduct all such operations in a good and 
workmanlike manner, but it shall have no liability as Operator to the other 
parties for losses sustained, or liabilities incurred, except such as may 
result from gross negligence or from breach of the provisions of this 
agreement.”200 This clearly seems to create two exceptions to the 
protection provided by the exculpatory clauses—one for liabilities arising 
from gross negligence and a second for liabilities arising from a breach of 
the operating agreement.201
When the 1977 version of the AAPL Model 610 was drafted, the 
exculpatory clause was again included in the same sentence that 
established a standard of conduct. But the 1977 exculpatory clause 
contains language different than that in the 1956 Form. In the 1977 Form, 
the relevant sentence provides: “[The Operator] shall conduct all such 
operations in a good and workmanlike manner, but it shall have no liability 
as Operator to the other parties for losses sustained or liabilities incurred, 
except such as may result from gross negligence or willful misconduct.”202
The revision eliminated the express reference to an exception to the 
Operator’s exculpation from liability for “a breach of the operating 
agreement,” but it added a “willful misconduct” exception. The 
exculpatory clause remained the same in the 1982 version of the Form 610.
                                                                                                            
199. See, e.g., Jonathan A. Hunter & Cheryl M. Kornick, Operator Liability in 
the 21st Century: Is Being in Charge Still Worth It?, 51 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST.
15-1 (2005).
200. 1956 AAPL 610 art. 5.
201. Ernest E. Smith & John S. Lowe, The Operator: Liability to Non-
Operators, Resignation, Removal and Selection of a Successor, ROCKY MTN.
MIN. L. FOUND. 2 (2008).
202. 1977 AAPL 610 art. V.A.
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The 1977 and 1982 exculpatory clauses could be interpreted as 
expanding the Operator’s protection by eliminating the exception for 
breach of the agreement. Under such an interpretation, the Operator could 
still be held liable as Operator for a breach of the agreement if the breach 
also constituted an example of gross negligence or willful misconduct.
Such an interpretation received some support in commentary. For 
example, Professor Ernest E. Smith concluded, “[t]he history of the 
language used in the model form suggests that” the 1977 and 1982 
exculpatory clauses protect the Operator even against liability for breaches 
of specific clauses of the joint operating agreement, provided that the 
breaches do not rise to the level of gross negligence or willful 
misconduct.203
This interpretation also received some support in case law. The 
leading case following this view is Stine v. Marathon Oil Co.,204 a diversity 
case from Texas. In Stine, the non-operator asserted that the Operator 
breached specific provisions of the parties’ joint operating agreement by 
plugging and abandoning two wells without first informing the non-
operator and giving him a chance to take over the wells, and also by failing 
to deliver certain information to the non-operators. The jury returned a 
verdict for the non-operator and the trial court entered a money judgment 
based on the verdict. The Operator appealed, arguing that it was protected 
by the exculpatory clause in the parties’ agreement, which used the same
language as is found in the exculpatory clauses found in the 1977 and 1982 
Forms. The United States Fifth Circuit agreed with the Operator and 
reversed (in part). The Fifth Circuit held that the exculpatory language 
used in the 1977 and 1982 AAPL Form 610 agreements protects the 
Operator from liability, absent gross negligence or willful misconduct, for 
any action that the Operator takes in the capacity as Operator, even if the 
action constitutes a breach of the agreement.205
Alternatively, someone could argue—particularly that the 1977 and 
1982 exculpatory clauses appear in the same sentence as a clause 
establishing a standard of conduct for “operations”—that the clauses have 
no application for liabilities arising from the Operator’s breach of 
particular duties that are expressly imposed by the agreement, particularly 
if the duties are not part of “operations.” This view also received some 
                                                                                                            
203. Ernest E. Smith, Duties and Obligations Owed by an Operator to 
Nonoperators, Investors, and Other Interest Owners, 32 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST.
12-30 (1986). For an interesting discussion of the meaning of “gross negligence” 
and “willful misconduct,” with a focus on the context of the use of those terms in 
the Oil Pollution Act, see Patrick H. Martin, The BP Spill and the Meaning of 
“Gross Negligence or Willful Misconduct,” 71 LA. L. REV. 957 (2011). 
204. 976 F.2d 254 (5th Cir. 1992).
205. Stine, 976 F.2d at 261.
2019] A COMPARISON OF OPERATORSHIP PROVISIONS IN OIL & GAS JOAS 127
support in commentary, as well as in the courts.206 For example, in contrast 
to Stine’s Erie-guess that Texas law would apply the 1977 and 1982 
exculpatory clause to all conduct by the Operator even if it involved breach 
of an express provision of the joint operating agreement, some Texas state 
appellate courts concluded that the clause would not apply to such 
breaches.207
Similarly, the United States Tenth Circuit concluded that exculpatory 
clauses based on the 1977 and 1982 language would not apply to breaches 
of express clauses of the agreement. In Shell v. Rocky Mountain 
Production, LLC v. v. Ultra Resources, Inc., a non-operator claimed that 
the Operator breached the operating agreement’s clauses regarding 
obtaining competitive prices for drilling.208 The Operator argued that the
exculpatory clause applied and that the non-operator could not recover 
unless it proved that the Operator had engaged in gross negligence or 
willful misconduct. The United States Tenth Circuit disagreed, holding 
that the clause did not protect the Operator against liability for breaches of 
duties expressly imposed by the joint operating agreement.209 Thus, Ultra 
Resources and Stine reached opposing views on the scope of the 1977 and 
1982 exculpatory clauses.
The exculpatory clause was changed in the 1989 version of the AAPL 
Form 610. Like the prior Forms, the 1989 Form included both the 
exculpatory clause and the clause that establishes a standard of conduct in 
a single sentence. In the 1989 Form, however, both of those clauses have 
different language than in earlier drafts of the Form. In the 1989 Form, the 
sentence reads: 
Operator shall conduct its activities under this agreement as a 
reasonable prudent operator, in a good and workmanlike manner, 
with due diligence and dispatch, in accordance with good oilfield 
practice, and in compliance with applicable law and regulation, 
but in no event shall it have any liability as Operator to the other 
parties for losses sustained or liabilities incurred except such as 
may result from gross negligence or willful misconduct.
The Texas Supreme Court addressed the scope of the 1989 protection in 
Reeder v. Wood County Energy, LLC.210 In that case, non-operators 
                                                                                                            
206. Gary Conine, The Prudent Operator Standard: Applications Beyond the 
Oil and Gas Lease, 41 NATURAL RES. J. 23 (2001).
207. See, e.g., Castle Tex. Prod. Ltd. P’ship v. Long Trusts, 134 S.W.3d 267, 
283 (Tex. App. Tyler 2003); Abraxus Petroleum Corp. v. Hornburg, 20 S.W.3d 
741 (Tex. App. El Paso 2000).
208. 415 F.3d 1158 (10th Cir. 2005).
209. Id.
210. 395 S.W.3d 789 (Tex. 2013).
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asserted that the Operator committed various breaches of the joint 
operating agreement. The Texas Supreme Court opened its discussion of 
the issues by stating that it needed to decide “whether the exculpatory 
clause in the JOA sets the standard to adjudicate the breach of contract 
claims against [the Operator].”211 Ultimately, the court decided that the 
1989 clause would apply. The court noted that the sentence containing the 
exculpatory clause had been changed to provide that the Operator must 
conduct its “activities” as a reasonably prudent operator, whereas the 1982 
and 1977 versions of the clause had applied to operations. Thus, the 
change seemed to broaden the prudent operator standard from just 
operational activities to all activities. The court reasoned that the change 
in language similarly had the effect of expanding the scope of liability 
protection from operational activities to all activities.212 Thus, Reeder gave 
a broad interpretation of the 1989 exculpatory language, concluding that it 
provides protection for all activities of the Operator, unless the conduct 
involves gross negligence or willful misconduct.213 The scope of the 1982 
and 1977 exculpatory clauses was not before the court, and it did not opine 
on the scope of those clauses, but the court’s emphasis on the significance 
of the change in language from “operations” to “activities” could be read 
as implying that the 1982 and 1977 language might not apply to breaches 
of duties expressly imposed by the joint operating agreement.
The language of the exculpatory clause was revised again in the 2015 
version of the AAPL Form 610. The revision seems to be a response to 
Reeder. Like the 1989 Form, the 2015 Form uses broad language when it 
imposes a standard of conduct—applying the standard to all of the 
Operator’s “activities,” not just to operations. But the portion of the 
language that contains the exculpatory language now refers only to 
operations. In particular, the language reads: 
Operator shall conduct its activities under this agreement as a 
reasonably prudent operator, in a good and workmanlike manner, 
with due diligence and dispatch, in accordance with good oilfield 
practice, and in compliance with applicable law and regulation.
However, in no event shall it have any liability as Operator to the 
other parties for losses sustained or liabilities incurred in 
connection with authorized or approved operations under this 
agreement except such as may result from gross negligence or 
willful misconduct.214
                                                                                                            
211. Reeder, 395 S.W.3d at 792. 
212. Id.
213. Id. at 795.
214. 2015 AAPL 610 art. V.A.
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There is still potential for a court to interpret the exculpatory clause
broadly. The new language does not go back to the 1956 language, which 
expressly put liabilities arising from a breach of the agreement outside the 
scope of the exculpatory clause. Further, a court could interpret “in 
connection with” broadly. But given the history of the changes to the
clause and the cases interpreting the exculpatory clause, it seems likely 
that a court will conclude that the 2015 exculpatory clause has a narrower 
scope than that of the 1989 clause as it is interpreted in Reeder.
AAPL Form 710 states in capital letters, “OPERATOR SHALL NOT 
BE LIABLE TO NON-OPERATORS FOR LOSSES SUSTAINED OR 
LIABILITIES INCURRED, EXCEPT AS MAY RESULT FROM 
OPERATOR’S GROSS NEGLIGENCE OR WILLFUL 
MISCONDUCT.”215 This sentence does not expressly restrict application 
of the exculpatory clause to any particular sort of activity. Thus, the 
exculpation clause arguably applies to any sort of activity, even 
administrative tasks, and it arguably applies even if the Operator’s action 
or inaction constitutes a breach of the agreement. On the other hand, the 
clause appears in the middle of a section that deals with operations and the 
standard of care for such operations. Accordingly, someone could 
plausibly argue that the clause applies only with respect to operational 
activities and that it protects the Operator against liability for an alleged 
breach of a standard of care (so long as the breach does not arise to the 
level of gross negligence), but not against liability for breach of an express 
and specific contractual requirement.
AAPL offshore Form 810 contains language almost identical to that 
which is used in Form 710. Further, like the exculpatory clause in Form 
710, the exculpatory clause in Form 810 is written in all capital letters, and 
it appears in the middle of a paragraph that imposes a standard of care for 
the conduct of operations. RMMLF Form 3 also gives the Operator broad 
protection—perhaps broader than the AAPL Forms—by stating that the 
“Operator shall not be liable to any other Party for losses sustained in the 
                                                                                                            
215. AAPL 710 art. 5. As between the parties to the operating agreement, this 
clause is designed to protect the Operator from losses or liabilities arising from 
the Operator’s own negligence, as long as the negligence does not rise to the level 
of gross negligence. Under the laws of some states, an indemnity clause that 
protects the indemnitee from liability for its own negligence must be conspicuous 
(the clause may also need to either expressly state that it applies even if the 
indemnitee was negligent or be clear and unambiguous in its application). All 
capital letters may help the clause satisfy the requirement of being conspicuous. 
State law would apply in state waters. Also, on the federal Outer Continental 
Shelf, the contract law of the nearest state typically is borrowed as surrogate 
federal law to govern disputes.
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conduct of its operations hereunder, except such losses as may result from 
Operator’s bad faith.”216
2. Forms Used Outside the U.S.
Model form operating agreements used outside the United States also 
contain exculpatory clauses that protect the Operator, some of which 
provide even broader protection to the operator than the forms most 
commonly used in the U.S.
The Australian and Canadian forms contain exculpatory clauses that 
are similar in scope to the exculpatory clauses in most of the AAPL Forms.
AMPLA section 6.5 provides that “the Operator is not liable to the [Non-
Operators] for any loss sustained or liability incurred in connection with 
the” joint operations, unless the Operator or a person for whom the 
Operator is vicariously liable “has committed fraud or Wilful 
Misconduct.”217 AMPLA section 6.6 requires each Non-Operator to 
indemnify the Operator for the Non-Operator’s proportionate share of 
losses or liabilities not caused by such fraud or Wilful Misconduct, and 
section 6.7 requires the Operator to indemnify the other parties for losses 
or liabilities that are caused by such fraud or Wilful Misconduct. The 
CAPL Form is somewhat similar.218
The UKCS Form, though, contains an exculpatory clause that may 
give the Operator even broader protection. The UKCS Form provides that 
the parties’ obligation to indemnify the Operator in proportion to their 
respective ownership shares applies to all liabilities arising from 
operations, except those that arise from the Operator’s “Wilful 
Misconduct.”219 The UKCS Form defines “Wilful Misconduct” in a 
manner that probably encompasses both gross negligence and intentional 
misconduct, but only by as meaning “an intentional or reckless disregard 
by Senior Managerial Personnel of Good Oilfield Practice or any of the 
terms of this Agreement.”220 Curiously, the UKCS Form does not define 
“Senior Managerial Personnel,” but (in what may be a drafting error) it 
defines “Senior Supervisory Personnel” in part as meaning “any person 
                                                                                                            
216. Rocky Mountain Form 3 art. 4.5.
217. AMPLA cl. 6.5.
218. As between the parties, CAPL generally limits the Operator’s liability as 
Operator to circumstances in which losses or liabilities arise from “Gross 
Negligence or Wilful Misconduct of the Operator, its Affiliates or their respective 
directors, officers, employees, agents or contractors.” CAPL cl. 4.02. Barring such 
circumstances, the parties agree to bear liabilities arising from operations in 
proportion to their ownership share and to indemnify the Operator against liability 
exceeding its ownership share. CAPL cl. 4.01. 
219. UKCS cl. 22.2.2. 
220. UKCS cl. 1.1 (emphasis added).
2019] A COMPARISON OF OPERATORSHIP PROVISIONS IN OIL & GAS JOAS 131
employed by a Party as a director or other corporate officer or who 
occupies a senior managerial position in such Party with direct 
responsibility for the conduct of operations.”
The 2012 AIPN Form contains multiple options for the language of 
the exculpatory clause, and the parties will need to choose which option 
they prefer. The main option provides some of the broadest protection 
found in any model form. This exculpatory clause provides the Operator 
with protection against virtually all liabilities, even against liabilities 
arising from its gross negligence or willful misconduct;221 but the Form 
also contains an optional clause that can negate the exculpatory clause in 
whole or part for liabilities that arise from the gross negligence or willful 
misconduct of “Senior Supervisory Personnel.”222 If that option is chosen, 
the level of protection provided to the Operator will still be broader than 
that provided by most model forms, and will be similar to that provided by 
the UKCS Form.
V. RESIGNATIONS OF THE OPERATOR AND AUTOMATIC TERMINATIONS
Most joint operating agreement forms contain provisions recognizing 
that an Operator may resign, and some forms also specify circumstances 
that will result in a “deemed resignation” or an automatic termination of a 
party’s status as Operator. The first subsection below discusses the way 
that model form joint operating agreements govern express resignations 
by the Operator, and the next subsection discusses provisions that provide 
for “deemed resignations” or automatic termination of a party’s status as 
Operator when particular circumstances arise. 
A. Express Resignations 
All of the commonly-used JOA forms expressly allow the Operator to 
resign, though each requires that the Operator give appropriate notice and 
specifies some minimum time between the notice of resignation and the 
effective date of the resignation. The delay in the effective date of the 
resignation is designed to give the parties adequate time to select a new 
Operator and for that Operator to prepare to assume the role of Operator.
For example, under the 2015 version of AAPL Form 610, the 
“Operator may resign at any time by giving written notice thereof to Non-
Operators.”223 Similar provisions appear in each of the prior versions of 
                                                                                                            
221. 2012 AIPN art. 4.6.A and 4.6.B.
222. 2012 AIPN art. 4.6.D.
223. 2015 AAPL 610 art. V.B.1. 
The giving of notices, including notices of resignation, is governed by Article XII 
under the 2015, 1989, 1982, and 1977 Forms. Section 20 of the 1956 Form 
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AAPL Form 610, as well as in the AAPL forms designed for use 
offshore.224 The 2015 Form states that a resignation will be effective “on the 
earlier of . . . [t]he time and date that a successor Operator has been selected .
. . and assumes the duties of Operator . . . or 7:00 o’clock A.M. on the first 
day of the calendar month following the expiration of ninety (90) days after 
the giving of notice of resignation.”225 This language slightly differs from the 
language used in the prior AAPL forms, but the difference in language may 
not bring about a substantive change in the effective date and time of 
resignations. The 1989, 1982, and 1977 Forms each provided that a 
resignation generally would “not become effective until 7:00 o’clock A.M. on 
the first day of the calendar month following the expiration of ninety (90) days 
after the giving of notice of resignation . . . unless a successor Operator has 
been selected and assumes the duties of Operator at an earlier date.”226
The CAPL Form allows the Operator to resign with just forty-five days’
notice227—a shorter notice period than mandated by the AAPL Forms—but 
most joint operating agreements used outside the U.S. provide for a longer
delay between notice of resignation and the effective date of resignation.
The AIPN 2012 Model provides that, “Subject to Article 4.11, Operator may 
resign as Operator by so notifying the other Parties at least one hundred and 
twenty (120) Days before the effective date of such resignation.” Article 
4.11.E of the AIPN Form further provides that a resignation is not effective 
until any necessary government approvals are obtained. This provision is 
included in recognition of the fact that many host governments prohibit a 
change in Operator without government consent. The 2011 version of 
AMPLA, an Australian form, provides that an Operator may resign, “having 
                                                                                                            
governed the giving of notice. Article XII specifies what methods of delivery may 
be used and the point in time when delivery is considered complete (typically, 
“when received”). An Operator that wishes to resign should make sure that it uses 
an authorized method of delivering its notice of resignation in order to avoid a 
potential dispute regarding whether the resignation was effective.
224. The 1989, 1982, and 1977 Forms each contained an Article V.B.1. that 
included a sentence identical in language that found in the 2015 Form—“Operator 
may resign at any time by giving written notice thereof to Non-Operators.”
Section 20 of the 1956 Form contained a provision that was identical in substance: 
“Operator may resign from its duties and obligations as Operator at any time upon 
written notice of not less than ninety (90) days given to all other parties.” Article 
4.3 of AAPL 810 generally allows the Operator to resign by giving written notice. 
See also AAPL 710 art. 4.3.
225. 2015 AAPL 610 art. V.B.7.
226. This provision is found in Article V.B.1. of the 1989, 1982, and 1977 
Forms. Section 20 of the 1956 Form provided that the Operator could resign 
“upon written notice of not less than ninety (90) days.” See also AAPL-710 (2002) 
§ 4.6; AAPL-810 (2007) § 4.6.
Article 4.2 of Rocky Mountain Form 3 provides that the Operator may resign with 
3 months’ notice.
227. CAPL cl. 2.04.
2019] A COMPARISON OF OPERATORSHIP PROVISIONS IN OIL & GAS JOAS 133
given at least 180 days’ notice.”228 A form used on the United Kingdom 
Continental Shelf provides that an Operator has the “right to resign . . . at 
the end of any Month by giving not less than one hundred and eight (180) 
days notice to the Participants or such shorter period of notice as” a
committee of the parties “may decide.”229
If the Operator ceases performance of its duties early, it may be liable 
for breach of contract. In Lancaster v. Petroleum Corp., the parties were 
using a joint operating agreement which provided: “Operator may resign 
from its duties and obligations as Operator at any time upon written notice 
of not less than ninety (90) days given to all other parties.”230 On March 
16, 1977, a natural gas well blew out. On March 21, the Operator notified 
the other parties that it was resigning. On March 25, just four days after 
giving notice, the Operator threatened to plug and abandon the well unless 
the other parties found a replacement Operator by 5:00 p.m. that day. One 
of the parties—Lancaster—found a company that agreed to become 
Operator on short notice, but only if Lancaster turned over a substantial 
portion of a back-in interest that it owned. Lancaster agreed, perhaps 
feeling that it had little choice. The well was brought under control and 
recompleted, after which it produced in paying quantities, though it never 
reached payout.
Lancaster brought suit against the former Operator for breach of the JOA 
provision that required the Operator to give ninety days’ notice before its 
resignation would be effective. The district court found that the Operator did 
not breach the contract, but the Louisiana Third Circuit reversed, concluding 
that it was “abundantly clear” that the Operator had breached the contract’s 
ninety-day notice requirement.231 The court then awarded damages based on 
the market value of the mineral interest that Lancaster relinquished in order to 
entice a company to agree to become Operator on such short notice.232
Neither the 2015 Form nor the earlier AAPL Forms specify who 
decides whether the successor Operator will assume the duties of Operator 
prior to the date on which the outgoing Operator’s resignation would 
otherwise be effective. Because the delay in effective date protects the 
Non-Operators, it seems clear that the outgoing Operator should not have 
the right to demand that the successor Operator assume the duties of 
                                                                                                            
228. AMPLA cl. 6.2(b).
229. UKCS cl. 5.2.1.
230. Lancaster v. Petroleum Corp., 491 So. 2d 768, 776 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 
1986). The quoted language is identical to that in the first sentence of Section 20 
of the 1956 Form. Based on this and other quoted language, it appears that the 
parties’ agreement was largely based on the 1956 Form, but that it contained 
additional provisions.
231. Id. at 777.
232. Id. at 777-8.
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Operator “earlier.” Further, the parties other than the successor Operator 
and outgoing Operator probably do not have a right to demand that the 
successor assume responsibilities earlier. But if the successor Operator has 
been selected and believes it is ready to assume its new duties earlier, does 
the successor have a right to demand that the outgoing Operator relinquish 
control earlier? Or, must the outgoing Operator, the other parties, or both,
concur? If the other parties must concur, is a majority sufficient? 
B. Deemed Resignations and Automatic Terminations of Operator
Under the 2015 version of AAPL Form 610, the Operator will be 
“deemed” to have resigned upon the occurrence of any one of three 
different circumstances. This is governed by Article V.B.2, which states:
2. Events Deemed Resignation of Operator: If, after the effective 
date of this agreement, Operator (i) terminates its legal existence, 
(ii) sells, transfers or has a loss of title to more than ____% of its 
interest in the Contrast Area as shown on Exhibit “A,” or (iii) is 
no longer capable of serving as Operator, then Operator shall be 
deemed to have resigned without any action by Non-Operators, 
except for selection of a successor Operator. A change of a 
corporate name or type of business entity of Operator shall not be 
deemed resignation of Operator.
The 1989 and 1982 Forms also provided for “deemed” resignations upon 
the occurrence of any one of three circumstances, but the 2015 version of 
the deemed-resignation is different from the two prior versions. Like the 
2015 Form, the 1989 and 1982 Forms provided that the Operator would 
be deemed to have resigned if it terminates its legal existence or it becomes 
incapable of serving as Operator. But otherwise, the 1989 and 1982 Forms 
only provided for a deemed resignation in the event that the Operator no 
longer owned an interest “hereunder in the Contract Area.” In contrast, as 
shown by the quoted language above, the 2015 Form contemplates that the 
parties may provide that the Operator is deemed to have resigned if it
reduces its ownership interest by a specified amount.
This change provides parties with more flexibility, which should be 
welcome. If parties wish to avoid having an Operator that owns no 
working interest whatsoever, they may wish to avoid having an Operator 
that owns only a small interest. But parties who use the 2015 Form should 
be careful to make sure they fill-in the blank contained in Article V.B.2. If 
the parties fail to fill-in the blank, it is not clear how a court would interpret 
that portion of Article V.B.2. For example, a court might treat the blank as 
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a zero, or it might conclude that the “transfer-of-interest” portion of the 
deemed-resignation clause will have no effect.
Further, parties should be careful to make sure, when they fill-in the 
blank, that they all have the same understanding of the clause. At least two 
potential bases for confusion exist. First, as written, the clause appears to 
require the parties to specify the portion of the Operator’s interest that 
must be transferred in order for there to be a deemed resignation, not the 
minimum portion that must be retained in order to avoid a deemed 
resignation.
Second, there could be confusion about what is meant by the 
percentage specified when they fill-in the blank. The percentage specified 
in Article V.B.2 refers to the percentage of the Operator’s interest, not the 
percentage of the total that must be transferred in order to trigger a deemed 
resignation. Thus, if the Operator starts with 40% of the total working 
interest, and the parties wish for there to be a deemed resignation if the 
Operator’s interest falls below 10% of the total working interest, the 
parties should fill-in the blank with “75” (because it would require the 
Operator transferring more than 30% of the total interest, which would 
equal 75% of its own interest, in order to trigger a deemed resignation).
If parties use the 2015 Form, they may wish to alter the form to address 
those potential bases of confusion. In addition, in the event that there is a 
change in the Operator, the parties should consider whether they wish to 
revise the Article V.B.2 percentage. Suppose, for instance, that the parties 
choose a successor Operator that owns 20% of the total working interest 
to replace an Operator that owned a 40% interest, but the parties still wish 
for a deemed resignation to occur in the event that the Operator’s total 
working interest falls below 10% of the total working interest. In that case, 
the parties would need to amend Article V.B.2 to provide that there would 
be a deemed resignation of the Operator if it transferred more than 50% of 
its own interest. Otherwise, if the parties retain the language providing that 
a deemed resignation will occur in event that the Operator transfers 75% 
of its interest, the new Operator that starts with 20% of the total working 
interest could drop to a 5% total interest before a deemed resignation 
occurs.
A fourth potential change relates to the fact that Article V.B.2 refers 
to a sale, transfer, or loss of title. The parties may wish to supplement 
Article V.B.2 to provide for the possibility of a deemed resignation if the 
Operator’s interest is reduced because of a failure of title under Article 
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IV.B.1,233 as well a loss of title under Article IV.B.2,234 but not a loss under 
Article IV.B.3. (A loss under Article IV.B.3 does not result in a 
readjustment of ownership percentages under the JOA, which are reflected 
on Exhibit “A.”).235
Other model forms also provide for various circumstances that will 
result in an automatic termination. Such circumstances include the 
Operator selling its entire ownership interest (or, under some agreements, 
selling enough that its ownership share falls below a specified percentage 
or below the percentage interest held by another party), and material 
breaches of the agreement that are not corrected after notice and a 
reasonable time to cure.236
C. Effect of Bankruptcy on Operator Status
The 2015 and 1989 versions of AAPL Form 610 provide that, if an 
Operator becomes insolvent, bankrupt, or is placed in receivership, the 
Operator will be “deemed to have resigned without any action by Non-
Operators, except the selection of a successor.”237 Those Forms recognize, 
                                                                                                            
233. A failure of title can occur under art. IV.B.1 when the parties are not co-
owners of a single lease, but instead they have each contributed separate leases or 
other mineral interests to a group of interests that will be governed by the JOA. In 
such circumstances, each party’s individual ownership percentage in the JOA 
will, presumably, reflect some agreed upon estimate of the value that the interest 
contributed by that party bears to the total value of all the interests governed by 
the JOA. A failure of title occurs if it is determined that title to an oil and gas lease 
or other mineral interest contributed by a party was invalid as of the effective date 
of the JOA. In the event of a failure of title, the ownership percentage (in the JOA) 
of the party who contributed that lease is adjusted downward unless the party 
timely acquires a new lease or otherwise cures the title failure. For a discussion 
of loss of title versus failure of title, see Gary B. Conine and Bruce M. Kramer, 
Property Provisions of the Joint Operating Agreement, ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. FDN.
SPECIAL INST. ON OIL AND GAS AGREEMENTS: JOINT OPERATIONS (2008).
234. A loss of title occurs under art. IV.B.2 if an oil and gas lease that was 
contributed by a party terminates after the effective date of the JOA because some 
payment necessary to maintain the lease was not paid. If the party that was 
responsible for making the payment cannot obtain a new lease to compensate for 
the loss of title, that party’s ownership percentage in the JOA is reduced.
235. If a lease that is subject to the JOA terminates after the effective date of 
the JOA because of a failure to develop the lease or to comply with implied 
covenants, there is no adjustment of ownership in the JOA.
236. 1989 AAPL 610 art. V.B.1; 1982 AAPL 610 art. V.B.1; 1977 AAPL 610 
art. V.B.1; AAPL 710 art. 4.3; AAPL 810 art. 810; AMPLA cl. 6.2; CAPL cl. 
2.02; Rocky Mountain Form 3 art. 4.3.
237. This is contained in art. V.B.3 of the 2015 and 1989 Forms. The 1982 and 
1977 Forms each provide in art. V.B.1 that the Non-Operators can remove the 
Operator if it “becomes insolvent, bankrupt or is placed in receivership.”
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however, that bankruptcy law or a bankruptcy court might prevent 
enforcement of this provision. The Forms provide:
If a petition for relief under the federal bankruptcy laws is filed by 
or against the Operator, and the removal of Operator is prevented 
by the federal bankruptcy court, all Non-Operators and Operator 
shall comprise an interim operating committee to serve until 
Operator has elected to reject or assume the agreement to the 
Bankruptcy Code.238
If there are only two parties to the agreement, a third person is appointed 
to the operating committee, presumably for the purpose of helping avoid 
deadlocks on committee votes.239
Other model forms also contain clauses stating either that the party 
serving as Operator will cease being Operator in the event that it enters 
bankruptcy or becomes insolvent or that the other parties have the right to
remove the bankrupt (or insolvent) party from the position of Operator.240
VI. REMOVAL OF OPERATOR
Most operating agreements allow the Non-Operators to remove the 
Operator under certain circumstances. The circumstances under which 
removal is allowed can vary from one model operating agreement to 
another. Some operating agreements only allow removal for “good cause”
or other specified reasons. Under other operating agreements, no special 
reason may be needed for the Non-Operators to remove the Operator. Like 
the circumstances (if any) needed to justify removal, the procedures for 
removal also will vary based on the particular operating agreement.
The 2015 version of the AAPL Form 610 contains different rules for 
removing an Operator that owns an interest governed by the agreement 
than for removing an Operator that does not own such an interest.241 The 
2015 Form’s rules for removing an Operator that owns an interest are 
similar to the rules for removing an Operator under earlier versions of the 
AAPL Form 610 (the earlier forms generally presume that an Operator 
will own an interest). Below, this Article discusses the general rules for 
removing an Operator under the 610 Forms (this includes the rules under 
the pre-2015 Forms and the 2015 rules for removing an Operator that owns 
                                                                                                            
238. 2015 AAPL 610 art. V.B.3; 1989 AAPL 610 art. V.B.3.
239. 2015 AAPL 610 art. V.B.3; 1989 AAPL 610 art. V.B.3.
240. 1982 AAPL 610 art. V.B.1; 1977 AAPL 610 art. V.B.1; AAPL 710 art. 
4.4(a); AAPL 810 art. 4.4.2(c); AIPN art. 4.10.A.1; AMPLA cl. 6.2.D; CAPL cl. 
2.02A(a); UKCS cl. 5.3.2(a).
241. See 2015 AAPL 610 art. V.B.4 (Operator that owns an interest) and art. 
V.B.5 (non-owning Operator).
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an interest), and the 2015 Form’s rules for removing a “non-owning 
Operator.”
A. General Rules for Removal of Operator Under AAPL Forms
The rules for removal include the substantive requirements needed to 
justify removal and the procedures that must be followed to remove an 
Operator.
1. The Substantive Grounds Necessary for Removal
The usual circumstance likely will be that the Operator owns an 
interest. Under the 2015 and 1989 versions of Form 610, an Operator that 
owns an interest “may be removed only” if “good cause” for removal 
exists and the Operator fails to “cure the default” that constitutes good 
cause within a specified time after delivery of a notice “detailing the 
alleged default.”242 The 2015 Form states that “‘good cause’ shall include, 
but not be limited to, Operator’s (i) gross negligence or willful 
misconduct; (ii) the material breach of or inability to meet the standards of 
operation contained in Article V.A.; or (iii) material failure or inability to 
perform its obligations or duties under this agreement.”243 The 1989 Form 
describes “good cause” in substantively identical language.
The “standard of operation” that is referenced in both the 2015 and the 
1989 Forms’ definition of “good cause” is described in identical language 
in Article V.A of each Form. The language states that the Operator must 
“conduct its activities under this agreement as a reasonably prudent 
operator, in a good and workmanlike manner, with due diligence and 
dispatch, in accordance with good oilfield practice, and in compliance with 
applicable law and regulations.”
The 1982 and 1977 Forms did not refer to “good cause” as a 
prerequisite for removal, but those Forms only authorized removal in 
certain circumstances. Under the 1982 and 1977 Forms, the Non-
Operators can remove the Operator “if it fails or refuses to carry out its 
duties hereunder, or becomes insolvent, bankrupt or is placed in 
receivership.”244 The 1982 and 1977 Forms do not require that the operator 
                                                                                                            
242. 2015 AAPL 610 art. V.B.4. Article XII of the form governs what is 
required for a “delivery.”
243. 2015 AAPL 610 art. V.B.4.
244. This provision is contained in art. V.B.1 of each of the Forms. There is 
some discussion of “good cause” and cases dealing with this issue in commentary. 
See, e.g., Christopher S. Kulander, Old Faves and New Raves: How Case Law 
Has Affected Form Joint Operating Agreements—Problems and Solutions (Part 
Two), 1 OIL AND GAS, NAT. RES., AND ENERGY J. 165 (2015).
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be given an opportunity to cure the grounds for removal. The 1956 version 
of the AAPL Model Form did not expressly provide for removal. 
AAPL Form 710 authorizes removal of the Operator in circumstances 
similar to the recent 610 forms. The parties may remove the Operator if 
the Operator “commits a substantial breach of a material provision of the 
operating agreement” and fails to cure it within a specified time, or if the 
Operator becomes insolvent.245 Form 710 also authorizes the parties to 
remove the Operator if the Operator makes a partial transfer of its working 
interest (other than to an affiliate) that is large enough so that the Operator 
no longer has the largest working interest of all parties to the agreement.246
The Operator is automatically removed if it ceases to own a working 
interest.247 AAPL Form 810 authorizes removal if the Operator commits 
“a substantial breach of a material provision” of the joint operating 
agreement and, after notice of the breach, either fails to correct the breach 
within thirty days, if the breach is one that can reasonably be cured within 
that time, or fails to commence a cure within thirty days if the breach is 
one that cannot be cured within thirty days.248
2. Procedure for Removal
Under the 2015 and 1989 versions of Form 610, an operator cannot be 
removed unless it fails to cure the grounds for removal within a specified 
time after receiving notice of the “default.” The pre-removal notice to the 
Operator must be in writing.249 The amount of time to which the Operator 
is entitled for curing the default depends on the circumstances. The general 
rule is that the Operator is entitled to thirty days, but the Operator is only 
entitled to forty-eight hours to cure “if the default concerns an operation 
then being conducted.”250 As previously noted, the 1982 and 1977 Forms 
do not require that the Non-Operators give the Operator an opportunity to 
cure.
Subject to the existence of grounds for removal and the Operator’s right 
to attempt to cure such “default,” the 2015 and 1989 Forms provide that 
Non-Operators can remove the Operator “by the affirmative vote of Non-
Operators owning a majority interest based on ownership as shown on 
Exhibit ‘A’ remaining after excluding the voting interest of Operator.”251
Similarly, if grounds for removal exist, the 1982 and 1977 Forms allow the 
                                                                                                            
245. AAPL 710 art. 4.4(d).
246. AAPL 710 art. 4.4(c).
247. AAPL Form 710 art. 4.3.
248. AAPL Form 810 art. 4.4.2(b).
249. 2015 AAPL Form 610 art. V.B.4; 1989 AAPL Form 610 art. V.B.1. 
250. Id.
251. Id.
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Non-Operators to remove the Operator by the vote of parties “owning a 
majority interest . . . remaining after excluding the voting interest of 
Operator.”252 But the 1982 and 1977 Forms add an additional requirement—
those Forms require that there be two or more Non-Operators voting for 
removal.253 The 2015 and 1989 Forms do not include such a requirement.
Thus, if the Operator has a 40% ownership interest, so that the Non-
Operators collectively own 60% “after excluding the voting interest of 
Operator,” the parties seeking removal of the Operator under Form 610 
would need an “affirmative vote” for removal from a majority of the 60%.
In other words, they would need a vote for removal from Non-Operators 
holding interests that exceed 30%, assuming that all of the Non-Operators 
vote. Further, under the 1982 and 1977 Forms, that vote would need to 
come from at least two Non-Operators. If one of the Non-Operators held 
a 35% interest, that party’s vote would not be sufficient to remove the 
Operator.
It is worth noting that the Forms require an “affirmative vote” of a 
majority in interest (after excluding the Operator’s interest), not a majority 
in interest of those who choose to vote. Thus, if a Non-Operator fails to 
vote or votes to abstain, that non-vote or abstention may effectively work 
as a vote against removal. That being said, the AAPL Forms do not attempt 
to govern the removal process in minute detail. For example, the Forms do 
not specify whether an in-person meeting is required or whether votes by 
mail or email are sufficient. The Forms also do not specify whether votes 
(assuming that there is a meeting) will be by voice vote or in writing or 
who will chair the meeting.
B. Removal of Non-Owning Operator Under 2015 Version of AAPL 
Form 610
The 2015 version of the AAPL Form 610 contains special rules for 
removing an Operator that does not own an interest governed by the 
agreement.254 Such an Operator may be removed in one of two ways. First, 
such an Operator “may be removed at any time, with or without good 
cause, by an affirmative vote of parties owning a majority ownership 
interest” under the agreement.255 This procedure does not require notice or
an opportunity to cure.
Second, if good cause for removal of a non-owning Operator exists, 
the Operator may be removed by a vote of Non-Operators owning a 
                                                                                                            
252. 1982 AAPL Form 610 art. V.B.1; 1977 AAPL Form 610 art. V.B.1.
253. 1982 AAPL Form 610 art. V.B.1; 1977 AAPL Form 610 art. V.B.1.
254. 2015 AAPL Form 610 art. V.B.5.
255. Id.
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majority of the interest that remains after excluding the interest of any 
Affiliate of the Operator.256 Removal of a non-owning Operator under this 
second method must follow the removal procedure specified for removing 
an Operator that owns an interest.257 Thus, the Operator would have to be 
given written notice and time to cure the alleged default.
The special rules for removal of a non-owning Operator are new in the 
2015 Form. Before, there was no need for such provisions because the 
prior versions of the AAPL Form 610 required that the Operator own an 
interest that was governed by the agreement. 
C. Forms Used Outside the U.S.
Like the AAPL Forms, model form operating agreements used outside 
the United States typically provide that the Operator may be removed in 
the event of a serious breach of its duties. The 2012 AIPN Form provides 
that the Non-Operators may remove the Operator if the Operator commits 
a material breach of the joint operating agreement and, after being given 
notice of the breach, either fails to commence a cure within thirty days or 
fails to diligently pursue a cure to completion.258 The Form contains blank 
spaces that give the parties the chance to choose the percentage vote (in 
ownership interest) of the Non-Operators that is required to remove the 
Operator and whether a certain number of Non-Operators (by heads) also 
must vote in favor of removal in order for the Operator to be removed.259
If the Operator disputes whether it committed a material breach or failed 
to cure it, the Operator remains appointed until the matter is resolved as 
provided in the agreement’s dispute resolution section (typically by 
arbitration).260
The AMPLA Form provides that “[t]he appointment of the Operator 
continues [until] the Operator commits a Breach Default Event and fails 
to remedy the default within 60 days of service of a written notice of 
default served by a [Non-Operator].”261 The Form defines “Breach Default 
Event” as including various insolvency events or a “material breach of any 
of its material obligations” other than a failure to timely pay money due 
under the agreement.262 Clause 5.3.1 of the UKCS form contains a similar 
provision.
                                                                                                            
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. 2012 AIPN art. 4.10.B.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. AMPLA cl. 6.2(d).
262. AMPLA cl. 1.1.
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The CAPL Form also has a unique means of removal—the “challenge 
of operator.” Clause 2.03.A provides that, if any non-operator party is 
prepared to conduct joint operations “on more favourable terms and 
conditions,” it can propose that it do so. The existing Operator then has 
sixty days in which to agree to operate on the terms proposed by the 
challenger (in which case the incumbent Operator remains as Operator) or 
to resign (in which case the challenger is obligated to assume the 
operatorship on the terms it stated in the challenge). Given that Operators 
generally are expected to serve on a “no gain, no loss” basis, it is not clear 
that this sort of clause would be useful in many cases, though it is possible 
that a challenger would offer to charge less overhead than allowed under 
the contract or less for the use of its own personnel and equipment than an 
incumbent Operator.
VII. SELECTION OF SUCCESSOR OPERATOR
Most model form operating agreements contain provisions governing
the selection of a “successor Operator.” Often, these include substantive 
requirements that parties must own interests governed by the joint 
operating agreements in order to qualify for consideration as the successor 
operators. In addition, model forms generally contain provisions to govern 
the selection procedure.
A. General Requirement that Successor Operator Own an Interest
The 1989, 1982, and 1977 versions of AAPL Form 610 require that 
the successor Operator be chosen from amongst the parties to the joint 
operating agreement, which seems to limit the allowable candidates to 
those who own an interest governed by the joint operating agreement.263
(The 1956 version did not impose such a requirement.)264 The AAPL 710 
form also states that the parties must choose any successor Operator “from 
amongst the Parties.265
The 2015 version of AAPL Form 610 imposes a general requirement 
that the Operator own an interest, but the Form also expressly recognizes 
that the parties may choose a “non-owning Operator.”266 The 2015 Form 
goes on to state, however, that a “condition precedent” to a non-owner 
serving as Operator is that the “non-owning Operator and the Non-
                                                                                                            
263. This requirement is found in art. V.B.2 of the 1989, 1982, and 1977 
versions of AAPL Form 610.
264. 1956 AAPL 610 art. 20, entitled “Resignation of Operator.”
265. AAPL 710 art. 4.5.
266. 2015 AAPL 610 art. V.A.; A non-owning operator is sometimes called a 
“contract operator.”
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Operators must enter into a separate agreement, or insert Article XVI 
provisions [into the joint operating agreement], to govern the relationship 
between them.”267 Presumably, the parties to the joint operating agreement 
must unanimously agree to such a separate agreement or to such Article 
XVI provisions as a prerequisite to service of a non-owning Operator.
Although the 1989, 1982, and 1977 Forms require that any successor 
Operator be chosen from amongst the parties that own an interest, courts 
sometimes find that the parties waived this requirement or that they are 
estopped from raising an objection to the Operator’s lack of ownership 
interest when the parties chose a non-owning party as Operator and one of 
the parties did not object until the new Operator served for some time.268
Several other model forms do not expressly state that a successor 
Operator must own an interest governed by the agreement, but sometimes
the forms seem to assume that a successor Operator will own such an 
interest. For example, clause 2.06 of the CAPL Form provides that certain 
circumstances, such as insolvency, will preclude a “Party” from being 
appointed as Successor Operator. Companies that are “Parties” to the joint 
operating agreement will be owners. Obviously, the intent of Clause 2.06’s 
reference to “Party” is not to preclude insolvent owners from being 
selected as a successor Operator while allowing insolvent non-owners to 
be the successor Operator. Rather, the form simply assumes that the entity 
chosen to be the successor Operator will be a “Party” and hence an owner. 
B. Procedure for Choosing Successor Operator Under AAPL Forms
If an Operator resigns or is removed, the parties must elect a successor 
Operator.269 The parties entitled to vote include all parties that own an 
interest at the time the election occurs, including any new parties to whom 
the outgoing Operator has transferred its interest. This rule is made explicit 
in the 2015 Form, which states, “[t]he successor Operator shall be selected 
by . . . parties. . . including . . . the former Operator and/or any transferee(s) 
of the former Operator’s interest, to the extent that they are owners within 
                                                                                                            
267. Id.
268. Oklahoma Oil & Gas Expl. Drilling Program 1983-A v. W.M.A. Corp., 
877 P.2d 605, 608 (Okla. Civ. App. 1994); Oil Corp. v. Hillin, 890 S.W.2d 931, 
934 (Tex. App. El Paso 1994). 
269. The five versions of the AAPL 610 Model Form each provide that, after 
an Operator has resigned or been removed, a successor Operator “shall” be 
selected by “the parties.” 2015 AAPL 610 art. V.B.6; 1989 AAPL 610 art. V.B.2; 
1982 AAPL 610 art. V.B.2; 1977 AAPL 610 art. V.B.2; 1956 AAPL 610 art. 20. 
AAPL Forms 710 and 810 also state that, after resignation or removal of an 
Operator, the parties “shall” choose a successor Operator. AAPL 710 art. 4.5; 
AAPL 810 art. 4.5.
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the contract area.”270 The prior AAPL Forms were less explicit on this 
point, but should be interpreted in the same way. The earlier agreements 
refer to the “parties” voting,271 with “parties” broad enough to cover any 
entity owning an interest governed by the JOA, even if the entity only 
recently acquired an interest.
Indeed, an Oklahoma appellate court reached this result in a case 
decided under the 1956 Form. In Duncan Oil Properties, Inc. v. Vastar 
Resources, Inc., a new Operator had to be chosen because the former 
Operator had assigned its entire interest to Vastar Resources.272 One of the 
non-operators argued that Vastar was not entitled to vote. That non-
operator relied on Article 18 of the 1956 Form, which provided, “Should 
a sale be made by Operator of its rights and interests, the other parties shall 
have the right . . . to select a new Operator.” The non-operator argued that 
“other parties” only included the entities that already were parties to the 
JOA prior to the former Operator’s sale of its interest. The appellate court 
disagreed, suggesting that the word “other” was meant to exclude the 
former Operator that no longer held an interest, though it might still be 
bound by certain provisions in the JOA.273 As for the assignee of the 
former Operator’s interest, the court explained it “is now a party to the 
JOA” whose vote should be “counted in the selection of the new 
operator.”274 The court also noted that Article 20 referred to the “new 
Operator” being selected by “all” parties.275
The election rules contained in the 1977 through 2015 versions of the 
AAPL Form 610 have at least four common features: (1) each party that 
owns an interest at the time of the election is entitled to vote;276 (2) the
vote of each party is weighted by its ownership percentage; (3) if an 
Operator that was removed or is deemed to have resigned fails to vote or 
votes to succeed itself, the Operator’s vote is disregarded; and (4) a 
candidate for successor Operator must receive the vote of a majority in 
interest in order to be elected, or, if the Operator’s voting interest is 
disregarded for the reason specified above, the candidate must receive a 
majority in interest after excluding the voting interest of the Operator.277
                                                                                                            
270. 2015 AAPL 610 art. V.B.6.
271. The 1989 version of Form 610, for example, provides that the “[t]he 
successor Operator shall be selected by the parties owning a[n] . . . interest.” 1989
AAPL 610 art. V.B.2.
272. 16 P.3d 465 (Okla. 2000).
273. Id. at 468.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 467, 468.
276. This includes new parties to whom an outgoing Operator has transferred 
its interest.
277. 2015 AAPL 610 art. V.B.6; 1989 AAPL 610 art. V.B.2.; 1982 AAPL 610 
art. V.B.2; 1977 AAPL 610 art. V.B.2; 1956 AAPL 610 art. 20.
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These similarities aside, the election procedures in the 1977 though 2015 
versions of the Form contain some differences. 
The 1989 and 1982 versions of the AAPL Form 610 provide that “[t]he 
successor Operator shall be selected by the affirmative vote of two (2) or 
more parties owning a majority interest.”278 Thus, the vote of a single party 
would not be sufficient, no matter how large that party’s voting interest.
The 1977 Form requires the votes of two or more parties if the outgoing 
Operator’s vote is disregarded, but does not appear to require the votes of 
two or more when the outgoing Operator’s vote is not disregarded.279 The 
2015 Form eliminates the requirement that two or more parties vote for a 
candidate in order for that candidate to be elected successor Operator. The 
2015 Form states, “The successor Operator shall be selected by the 
affirmative vote of one (1) or more parties owning a majority interest.”280
It is possible for the parties to reach a deadlock in the election of a 
successor Operator. A deadlock can occur in one of at least four types of 
circumstance. The first circumstance is the situation in which a candidate 
needs both a majority in interest and the votes of two or more parties. If a 
party that holds a majority in interest (or a majority in interest of the votes 
that count if the outgoing Operator’s vote is being excluded) votes for a 
particular candidate and no other party supports that candidate, then no 
candidate will be able to obtain both a majority in interest and the support 
of two or more parties. Notably, the 2015 Form eliminates this potential 
for deadlock by eliminating the requirement that a candidate receive votes 
from two or more parties. 
Second, because the Forms appear to require the votes of a majority 
in interest, rather than a majority in interest of the parties that choose to 
vote, a deadlock could occur if some parties fail to vote or abstain. The 
Forms provide for disregarding the vote of an outgoing Operator that has 
been removed or is deemed to have resigned if that party fails to vote, but 
the Forms do not otherwise provide for disregarding the voting interest of 
any party that fails to vote.
A third potential deadlock scenario is possible, though it probably 
would be rare. If three or more candidates receive votes, then it is possible 
that no candidate would receive a majority even if there are no abstentions 
of failures to vote. The Forms do not provide for a run-off, so presumably 
multiple rounds of balloting could result in a continuing deadlock in which 
more than two candidates receive votes and no candidate receives a 
majority. 
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279. 1977 AAPL 610 art. V.B.2.
280. 2015 AAPL 610 art. V.B.6.
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Fourth, even if there are no abstentions and only two candidates for 
successor Operator, a deadlock could occur in the event that each of two 
candidates receives 50% of the vote. The 1989, 1982, and 1977 Forms do 
not provide any procedures for breaking a tie. Presumably, the tie could 
only be broken if a party changes its vote. In contrast, the 2015 Form 
provides a tie-breaker. The 2015 Form states that, if the “vote results in a 
tie, the candidate supported by the former Operator or a majority of its 
transferee(s) shall become the successor Operator.”
The 2015 Form does not completely eliminate the chance that a tie 
would result in a deadlock. A tie could still result in deadlock if the 
outgoing Operator refuses to support either of the candidates (perhaps in a 
situation in which the outgoing Operator is voting to succeed itself or 
refusing altogether to vote). Or, if the outgoing Operating transfers a 
portion of its interest to one or more transferees, while retaining a portion 
of its interest, and the “transferee(s)” who received a portion of the 
outgoing Operator’s interest reach a deadlock regarding how to break the 
tie vote that results when all parties have voted, the deadlock could remain.
Nonetheless, the 2015 Form’s tie-breaker mechanism should greatly 
reduce the risk that a tie-vote will result in deadlock.
If there is a 50% to 50% tie-vote, the operation of the tie-breaker seems 
reasonably straightforward. But a few questions can arise in other 
situations. Suppose, however, that there were three candidates for 
successor Operator. Two candidates each received a 40% vote, and the 
Operator “supported” the third candidate, who received a 20% vote. Can 
the Operator break the tie by choosing the candidate who received the 20% 
vote? Alternatively, suppose that one candidate receives 40% of the vote, 
another candidate receives 35%, and a 25% interest either abstains or votes 
for a third candidate. There is no tie, but there is a deadlock. Could the 
outgoing Operator break the tie? If the Operator has multiple assignees, do 
they vote by heads or percentage interest? Of course, these scenarios will 
probably not occur often, but they could be problematic on rare occasions.
The tie-breaker procedure seems to have merit because it lessens the 
chance of deadlock that could be very costly to the parties. On the other 
hand, a consequence of the tie-breaker is that whenever a single party owns 
a majority interest, that party is given more power, thus reducing the 
leverage of the minority owners.
The provision found in the 2015 Form that requires disregarding the 
vote of an outgoing Operator voting for itself or refusing to vote also has 
merit. This is illustrated by Fasken Land and Minerals, Ltd., v. Occidental 
Permian Ltd., in which Occidental Permian Ltd. (“OPL”) served as unit 
operator under a unit operating agreement.281 OPL owned nearly 75% of 
                                                                                                            
281. 225 S.W.3d 577 (Tex. App. 2005).
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the working interests. D.H. Acquisition Ltd. and two other entities that the 
court called the “Fasken entities” collectively held between 23% and 24% 
of the working interests. Two other companies held less than 1% each. 
The parties held a vote to remove OPL as Operator. Under the terms 
of the unit operating agreement, the working interest owners could 
“remove Unit Operator by the affirmative vote of at least eighty-five 
percent (85%) of the voting interest remaining after excluding the voting 
interest of Unit Operator.”282 All of the parties other than OPL voted to 
remove OPL.283 Thus, the vote was sufficient to remove OPL.
The parties then moved to the selection of a successor. The unit 
operating agreement provides that “a successor Unit Operator shall be 
selected by the affirmative vote of three (3) or more Working Interest 
Owners having at least eighty-five per cent (85%) of the combined voting 
interest of all Working Interest Owners, provided no Unit Operator who is 
removed may vote to succeed itself.”284 A representative of Fasken 
nominated D.H. Acquisition to be the successor operator.285 The parties 
other than OPL each voted in favor of D.H. Acquisition, but OPL voted 
its 74.67% interest “against” D.H. Acquisition.286 Thus, the affirmative 
vote was less than 25%. OPL conceded that it had been removed as 
Operator, but it argued that D.H. Acquisition had not been selected as a 
successor Operator because it failed to obtain an “affirmative vote of . . .
eighty-five per cent (85%) of the combined voting interest of all Working 
Interest Owners.” OPL also asserted that it had a right or duty to continue 
serving as Operator until a successor Operator was selected.
The Fasken entities brought suit in a Texas state court asserting 
multiple claims, including a claim that OPL breached the unit operating 
agreement by continuing to operate and by failing to recognize the 
selection of D.H. Acquisition as successor Operator. They argued that 
OPL’s vote against D.H. Acquisition was the equivalent of OPL voting for 
itself—something prohibited under the parties’ agreement.287
Accordingly, OPL’s negative vote should be disregarded. This would 
leave D.H. Acquisition with an affirmative vote from more than 85% of 
the voting interests counted.
The appellate court disagreed, concluding that the unit operating 
agreement was designed “to ensure” that the selection of a successor 
Operator would be based on an “affirmative vote” from a “super-majority”
of the working interest owners. Thus, OPL was entitled to vote against 
                                                                                                            
282. Fasken, 225 S.W.3d at 592.
283. Id. at 587.
284. Id. at 592.
285. Id. at 587.
286. Fasken, 225 S.W.3d at 587.
287. Id. at 592-3.
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D.H. Acquisition because such a vote was not the equivalent of OPL 
voting for itself. Further, the agreement required that the super-majority 
based on the vote of “at least 85 percent . . . of all working interest 
owners.” Thus, OPL’s vote could not be disregarded.
C. Other Forms
The 2012 AIPN Form provides that, after removal or resignation of an 
Operator, the operating committee must “meet as soon as possible to 
appoint a successor Operator.”288 If a party has been removed as Operator 
for reasons other than a decrease in ownership interest or a change in 
control of the entity, both of which can be grounds for removal under the 
AIPN Form,289 both that party and its affiliates are disqualified from 
consideration to be the successor Operator.290 The percentage vote needed 
for election as successor Operator is to be set by the parties in Article 
5.9.291 No party can be appointed as Operator against its will, and 
reflecting the fact that many nations require governmental approval before 
there is a change in Operator, the AIPN Form provides that the resignation 
or removal of a party as Operator and its replacement by a successor 
Operator, is not effective until any required governmental approval is 
obtained.292
The AMPLA Form provides that when an Operator resigns or is 
removed, the parties “must promptly appoint a new Operator.”293 The form 
provides that the parties may not reappoint an Operator that has been 
removed “for default or following an Insolvency Event.”294 The AMPLA 
Form also contains a provision that could help in the event that the parties 
reach an impasse in attempting to select a successor operator. In particular, 
the form provides that, “[i]f a new Operator cannot be appointed and act 
immediately, the [party] holding the largest Participating Interest must act 
as interim Operator until the new Operator is appointed and commences 
its duties.”295
The selection of a new Operator under the CAPL Form is governed by 
Clause 2.06. As a general rule, the election of a party as the new Operator 
requires the vote of at least two parties that are not affiliates and which 
collectively own more than 50% of the working interests governed by the 
                                                                                                            
288. 2012 AIPN art. 4.11.A.
289. 2012 AIPN arts. 4.10.C and 4.10.D.
290. 2012 AIPN art. 4.11.B.
291. 2012 AIPN art. 4.11.A. See also AIPN art. 5.9.
292. 2012 AIPN art. 4.11.A.; 2012 AIPN art. 4.11(E).
293. AMPLA cl. 6.4(a).
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agreement.296 However, a party that owns a 60% or larger interest can 
simply elect itself.297 A party cannot be elected as Operator unless it has 
given its written consent.298 A party is disqualified from being the new 
Operator if that party was replaced as Operator within the past 30 months 
or in the event that any of the circumstances exist that would justify 
removal of that party as Operator under the CAPL Form.299 If the parties 
are not able to timely select a new Operator before the outgoing Operator’s 
duty to serve ends, the party (other than the party that is being replaced as 
Operator) that has the largest interest generally will serve as Operator in 
the interim.300
Clause 5.5 of the UKCS provides for a successor Operator to be 
chosen by the operating committee, subject to approval by governmental 
authorities and the consent of the party that is selected.301 If no party is 
willing to serve as Operator, the agreement treats that as a decision to 
abandon the joint operations and relinquish the right to operate that was 
received by the granting instrument.302
VIII. TRANSFER OF OPERATORSHIP TO AFFILIATE OF OPERATOR
The 1989, 1982, and 1977 versions of AAPL Form 610 provide that a 
change of corporate name or structure, or the “transfer of Operator’s 
interest to any single subsidiary, parent or successor corporation shall not 
be the basis for removal of Operator.”303 This provision would seem to 
allow the Operator to transfer not only its ownership interest, but the 
Operatorship to another party, provided that such party is a “subsidiary, 
parent or successor corporation.” It also would seem necessary that the 
Operator transfer its entire interest to that party. The AAPL 710 Form 
contains a very similar optional provision, but the 2015 version of AAPL 
Form 610 eliminates this provision.304 Under the 2015 version, there does 
not appear to be any right to transfer the Operatorship to an affiliate.
With minor exceptions, the CAPL Form allows the Operator to 
transfer the operatorship to an affiliate to which the Operator is also 
assigning its ownership interest.305 The 2012 AIPN Form generally allows 
                                                                                                            
296. CAPL cl. 2.06(C).
297. Id.
298. CAPL cl. 2.06(D).
299. CAPL cl. 2.06(B).
300. CAPL cl. 2.06(D). If two parties tie for the largest interest, the one that 
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301. UKCS cl. 5.5.
302. UKCS cl. 5.6.
303. This is contained in art. V.B.1 of each of those three Forms.
304. AAPL 710 art. 4.4(e).
305. CAPL cl. 2.09.
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an Operator to assign the operatorship to an affiliate, as long as the 
Operator is assigning its entire interest to the affiliate.306 Such a transfer 
would seem to require operating committee approval under the AMPLA 
Form.307
The 1956 version of AAPL Form 610 provided that if the Operator 
sold its “rights and interest,” the Non-Operators would have the right, 
within sixty days of the sale, to select a new Operator “by a majority vote 
in interest,” but that absent such a selection the transferee would serve as 
Operator.308 The 1956 version did not distinguish between transfer to an 
affiliate and assignment to an unrelated party. Thus, the Non-Operator’s 
right to designate a new Operator appears to apply after the Operator 
transfers its interest to an affiliate. Likewise, Rocky Mountain Form 3 
appears to give the parties the right to select a successor Operator after any 
transaction in which the Operator “sell[s]” its entire interest, including 
when the transfer is to an affiliate.309
IX. ASSIGNMENT OF OPERATORSHIP TO NON-AFFILIATE
Sometimes the question arises whether an Operator may assign its 
right to operate to a Non-Affiliate.
A. AAPL Form 610
The position of Operator is created by contract and comes with certain 
contractual rights and duties. As a matter of general contract law, a party 
to a contract can freely assign its contractual rights—the consent of the 
other party or parties to the contract is not needed.310 There are exceptions 
to the free assignability of contracts if the parties have agreed that the 
rights cannot be assigned or the contract is one that is deemed purely 
personal.311
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307. AMPLA cl. 7.7(a).
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preferential rights provision).
309. Rocky Mountain 3 art. 4.3.
310. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACT § 317; Beattie v. State ex rel. 
Grand River Dam Auth., 41 P.3d 377, 381 (Okla. 2002); Crim Truck & Tractor 
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311. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACT § 317; Beattie v. State ex rel. 
Grand River Dam Auth., 41 P.3d 377, 381 (Okla. 2002); Crim Truck & Tractor 
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The 2015 Form expressly provides that the “Operatorship is [not] 
assignable.”312 Under basic principles of contract law, this prohibition 
should be enforceable. Accordingly, if an Operator purports to assign its 
Operating rights, the purported assignment should not have the effect of 
actually transferring operating rights. Instead, depending on 
circumstances, the purported assignment should be deemed as either a 
resignation by the Operator or as having no effect whatsoever.
The express prohibition on assignment of the Operatorship is a 
change. The 1989 Form (like the 1982 and 1977 Forms) did not expressly 
address whether the Operatorship could be assigned. On the other hand, 
certain provisions in those Forms could be read as implicitly making the 
Operatorship non-assignable.
In particular, each of the Forms provides that, if the Operator resigns, 
all of the parties participate in a vote to select the successor Operator. One 
could argue that, if an Operator purports to assign its Operating rights, the 
purported assignment is an attempt by the Operator to resign and select its 
own successor in violation of the Forms’ provisions that all parties 
participate in the selection of a successor Operator. Further, in at least one 
situation—that in which the Operator assigns its entire working interest 
and also purports to assign the operatorship—the argument that a 
purported assignment of the Operatorship violates the terms of the older 
AAPL 610 Forms is even stronger. This is because the 1989 and 1982 
Forms each provide that, if the Operator “no longer owns an interest 
hereunder in the Contract Area,” the Operator will be deemed to have 
resigned.313
The argument that the Operator may not transfer the operatorship to a 
Non-Affiliate arguably is strengthened by the provision in the 1989 
version of AAPL 610 that “[a] change of a corporate name or structure of 
Operator or transfer of Operator’s interest to any single subsidiary, parent 
or successor corporation shall not be the basis for removal of Operator.”314
Of course, the Operator who makes a purported assignment and the 
company that receives the assignment could make counterarguments. If 
the Operator purported to assign the Operatorship but retained an interest 
governed by the JOA (so that the “deemed resignation” provision does not 
apply), the Operator and its assignee could argue that an assignment is not 
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313. See 1989 AAPL 610 art. V.B.1; 1982 AAPL 610 art. V.B.1. Article V.B.1 
of the 1977 Form contains similar language, but it does not contain the word 
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termination, rather than saying it would not be a basis for removal.
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a resignation. Accordingly, there was no resignation and therefore no basis 
for applying the procedure for selecting a successor Operator upon the 
resignation of an Operator.
Further, even if the Operator assigned its entire interest along with the 
Operatorship, the Operator and its assignee could argue that there was no 
resignation. Suppose, for example, that a hypothetical Operator, “XYZ 
Corp.,” simultaneously assigned its working interest and Operatorship to 
NewCo Corp. In such a case, XYZ and NewCo could argue that the 
Operator never had zero interest because neither XYZ nor NewCo held the 
position of Operator at a time when it had zero interest. XYZ held a 
working interest up until the time that it assigned the Operatorship and 
NewCo received a working interest at the same time that it received an 
assignment of the Operatorship.
There is very little case law on the assignability of the Operatorship 
under the AAPL Forms. Some cases have held that, if an Operator 
assigned the Operatorship and the other parties did not timely object, those 
parties either waived the election requirement or were estopped from 
complaining about the lack of an election.315 Of course the application of 
waiver or estoppel theories under appropriate facts is not very remarkable.
But in at least one case, a court held that the Operatorship is assignable. In 
Santa Fe Energy Operating Partners, L.P. v. Universal Resources Corp.,
two parties that each owned a fifty percent interest in certain oil and gas 
properties entered a joint operating agreement, with Santa Fe Energy being 
the Operator.316 The parties appear to have used the 1982 Form.317 Several 
years later, Santa Fe assigned its working interest and its rights under the 
operating agreement to Bridge Oil Company. The Non-Operator 
(Universal Resources) filed suit in a Texas state court, arguing that Santa 
Fe could not assign its rights as Operator.
The trial court agreed and entered judgment for Universal. The 
appellate court reversed, but not based on the sort of potential argument 
outlined above. A contractual right can be non-assignable for one of two 
main reasons—the contract is purely personal or the parties have agreed 
that it will be non-assignable. The appellate court addressed both 
possibilities. The court concluded that the Operatorship was not purely 
                                                                                                            
315. Abraxas Petroleum Corp. v. Hornburg, 20 S.W.3d 741, 747 (Tex. App. 
El Paso 2000).
316. 1996 WL 457251 (Tex. App. 1996). 
317. The court did not state what form was being used, but the court quoted 
“Article V(B)(1)” from the parties’ contract. The 1989, 1982, and 1977 Forms 
each have slightly different wording in art. V.B.1, and the language quoted by the 
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personal, cited three cases that it said supported this conclusion, and then, 
without further analysis, declared that it agreed.318
Although the court’s opinion was short on analysis, the court’s 
conclusion that the Operatorship is not purely personal is probably correct. 
A contract is purely personal when “the duties imposed upon one party 
[are] of such a personal nature that their performance by someone else 
would in effect deprive the other party of that for which he bargained.”319
A classic example of a purely personal contract is one in which a party has 
contracted for a performance by a particular “artist or author whose skills 
and talents are unique.”320
The appellate court likewise concluded that the operating agreement 
itself did not bar assignment of the Operatorship. Universal argued that 
Article V.B.1 made the Operatorship non-assignable, but the court 
summarily dismissed the argument without seriously analyzing it. The 
court supported this result by breezily asserting that a provision in Article 
XVI of the JOA that the agreement was binding on successors and assigns 
would be rendered meaningless if Article V.B.1 was interpreted as making 
the Operatorship non-assignable.
But the appellate court’s assertion is plainly wrong. Even if the 
Operatorship was non-assignable, the agreement’s Article XVI still would 
have meaning because the working interests governed by the operating 
agreement apparently were assignable. The working interests are generally 
assignable and Universal does not appear to have argued that Santa Fe 
could not assign its working interest—only that Santa Fe could not assign 
the Operatorship. Thus, although plausible arguments exist in favor of the 
result reached by the court, the court’s reasoning was clearly flawed. 
Nonetheless, the result stands as authority that the Operatorship is 
assignable under the 1982 AAPL Form. And given that the relevant 
provisions of the 1989 and 1977 Form are similar to those in the 1982 
Form, Santa Fe could also be cited as authority to support an argument 
that the Operatorship is assignable under those Forms too.
In contrast to the conclusion reached by Santa Fe, some prominent oil 
and gas lawyers have concluded that the 1982 and 1989 AAPL Forms 
make the Operatorship non-assignable, at least in the cases in which an 
Operator transfers its entire working interest to someone else.
For example, in 2008, Professors Ernest Smith and John Lowe wrote 
that Article V.A of the 1989 Form “clearly contemplates that the choice of 
a new Operator is at the option of the JOA participants, rather than the 
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319. Farmland Irrigation Co. v. Dopplmaier, 308 P.2d 732, 740 (Cal. 1957). 
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outgoing operator” who no longer owns an interest, and that “an 
assignment of operating rights is contrary to the contractual procedure for 
selecting a successor operator.”321 They also seem to suggest that an 
assignment of operating rights, although not “expressly preclude[d]” by 
the language of the 1989 Form, is inconsistent with the expectations 
implied by the language of the Form.
A prominent practitioner, in discussing the standards for deemed 
resignation of the Operator in the 1989 Form, states: 
The second standard, “no longer owns an interest in the Contract 
Area,” is used frequently. It is this standard which prohibits a party 
who is the Operator from passing operatorship to a purchaser or 
assignee. The operatorship is personal to the party and cannot be 
assigned. When the Operator assigns its interest it “no longer owns 
an interest in the Contract Area” and it thus has no right to retain 
or assign operatorship. A successor Operator must be selected 
pursuant to Article V.B.2.322
Another prominent practitioner addressed the Santa Fe decision directly.
He suggested that the authorities cited by Santa Fe support the proposition 
that the rights and duties of an Operator are not purely personal, and 
therefore the Operator’s “rights to operate are generally assignable” absent 
a contrary provision in the joint operating agreement.323 He concluded, 
however, the holding of Santa Fe was wrong because the AAPL Forms’ 
change in Operator provisions supersede both the general assignability of 
contract rights and Article XVI’s assignment clause “in the context of a 
sale of all of the Operator’s interest.”324
An additional provision in the 1989, 1982, and 1977 Forms that 
suggests that the Operatorship is generally not assignable is the provision 
that provides that the Operator’s transfer of its interest to “any single 
subsidiary, parent or successor corporation shall not be the basis for 
removal of Operator.”325 If the Operatorship generally was assignable, this 
provision would not be necessary.
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Finally, as noted in the section above on transfer of the Operator’s 
interest to an affiliate, the 1956 Form allowed the assignment of the 
Operatorship when the Operator sold its interest, but subject to the other 
parties’ right to choose a new Operator within sixty days of the sale.326
B. AAPL Offshore Forms
Neither AAPL Model Form 710 nor Form 810 expressly prohibit 
assignment of the operatorship, but each provides that the parties to the 
operating agreement must choose a new Operator in the event that the 
Operator resigns (or is removed).327 A purported assignment of the 
position of Operator would effectively be a resignation, combined with a 
simultaneous transfer of the operatorship to a Successor Operator chosen 
by the outgoing Operator. Thus, a purported assignment would be 
inconsistent with the offshore forms’ stipulation that, after a resignation 
by the Operator, the successor Operator is chosen by the parties. One could 
argue that an assignment of the operatorship does not involve a resignation 
by the outgoing Operator, and that an assignment of the Operatorship is 
permissible, but any such argument seems inconsistent with the 
expectations within the industry.
C. International Forms
The 2012 AIPN Form prohibits the Operator from assigning its rights 
and duties as Operator to a Non-Affiliate.328 The CAPL Form generally 
does likewise.329 The UKCS Form does not expressly address assignment 
of the operatorship, but much like the AAPL offshore forms, it seems to 
anticipate that the parties as a whole, not the outgoing Operator alone, 
choose any successor Operator.330
The AMPLA Form states that “[t]he Operator may delegate to a Third 
Party, including an Affiliate, any of its rights, remedies, powers, 
discretions and obligations, provided that . . . the Operator may only 
delegate the whole of its rights, remedies, powers, discretions and 
obligations with the approval of the Operating Committee.”331 This would 
prohibit a general assignment of the operatorship, absent consent of the 
                                                                                                            
326. 1956 AAPL Form 610 art. 18.
327. AAPL Form 710 art. 4.5; AAPL 810 art. 4.5.
328. 2012 AIPN Form 4.12.
329. CAPL cls. 2.02(A)(g) & 2.09.
330. UKCS cl. 5.5.
331. AMPLA cl. 7.7.
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Operating Committee.332 The AMPLA Model Form requires an Operator 
who has delegated rights or obligations to inform the Operating
Committee at its next meeting of the delegation and the “identity of the 
delegate.”333 The Form states that a delegation does not relieve the 
Operator of any of its obligations.334
CONCLUSION
Often, multiple companies either co-own the oil and gas exploration
and production rights in a particular area or they separately own such 
rights in nearby areas that the companies have decided to explore and 
develop in a coordinated fashion. In these circumstances, the companies 
sometimes enter joint operating agreements to govern the exploration and 
development process and to define their respective rights and duties with 
respect to one another. Such agreements are common throughout the 
world, and they constitute one of the most important types of contracts that 
relate to oil and gas exploration and production.
Several model forms exist and are commonly used as the basis for joint 
operating agreements, though some parties draft their own agreements.
Although parties often “customize” their operating agreements by altering 
some terms in the model forms, the use of model forms saves transactional 
costs because parties become familiar with their terms. Moreover, the 
forms are drafted to handle various issues in ways that are generally 
accepted as commercially reasonable within the oil and gas industry, 
neither unduly favoring the party that serves as Operator or the parties who 
are Non-Operators. These factors combine to save drafting and negotiating 
time, and improve the likelihood that negotiations will result in agreement.
Probably the most common forms used for onshore operations in the 
United States are various versions of the AAPL Model Form 610 (the form 
has been updated several times over the years). The most recent version is 
the “2015 Form.” Other AAPL Forms are designed for use offshore.
Outside the United States, the 2012 AIPN Form is commonly used. Also, 
other model forms are common in specific jurisdictions.
Under virtually all joint operating agreements, a single party that is 
called the “Operator” is given both the right and duty to conduct all 
operations. Important issues relating to the Operatorship include: the 
                                                                                                            
332. If interpreted literally, this provision arguably would allow an Operator 
to assign the Operatorship to a Non-Affiliate, provided that the Operator retained 
some portion of its original obligations. For example, if the Operator retained the 
right and obligation to operate one well, the Operator might be able to assign all 
of its remaining rights and obligations.
333. Id.
334. Id.
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Operator’s duties, the standard of care to which an Operator is held, and 
the nature of the relationship between the Operator and Non-Operators.
Virtually all model forms attempt to have the Operator serve on a “no gain, 
no loss” basis. The “no gain, no loss” principle provides that the Operator 
should neither make a profit nor incur a loss because of its service as
Operator. Instead, the party that serves as Operator will make a profit or 
incur a loss based solely on its status as one of the owners of the oil and 
gas rights being developed.
Although there are some substantive differences between the 
provisions in different model form joint operating agreements, the 
similarities in terms are striking. One of the reasons for similarities 
between model forms is that the drafters of one model form considered the 
language of prior forms during the process of drafting a new form. Further, 
whether a joint operation is taking place in the southern United States, the 
Rockies, or in some other country, many of the same commercial 
considerations and balancing of interests between Operators and Non-
Operators will apply. Further, the similarities are probably driven by the 
fact that the oil and gas industry is, in part, an international industry, rather 
than a multitude of separate oil and gas industries in each jurisdiction or 
productive basin, and thus some of the industry’s customs, norms, and 
expectations remain constant from one jurisdiction to another.
Model forms typically try to ensure that the Operator, in the conduct 
of its duties as Operator, will be characterized as an independent 
contractor, rather than as an agent of the parties. Further, the model forms 
attempt to avoid the existence of a partnership or similar relationship 
between the parties. Rather than a partnership or similar relationship, the 
parties attempt to remain mere co-owners (or, in common law terms, 
“tenants in common”) who use the joint operating agreement to govern the 
exploration and development of their co-owned asset. In this way, the 
parties seek to have their relative rights and duties to one another governed 
by the joint operating agreement and the standards established by it, rather 
than standards imported from the laws governing partnership, principal-
agency relationships, or fiduciary relationships. 
